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JUSTICE SCALIA'S DUE PROCESS
TRADITIONALISM APPLIED TO
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION: THE
ILLUSION OF ADJUDICATION WITHOUT
JUDGMENTt
STEVEN R. GREENBERGER*
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that
so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.'
Tradition. Without our traditions, our lives would be as shaky
as—as a fiddler on the roof°
I began my legal career as a law clerk to an appellate court
judge. On my first day on the job the chief administrator of the
court summoned my fellow clerks and me to an orientation. He
ended the orientation with a story, perhaps apocryphal. It seems
that the court bailiff, who had occupied the position for many years,
was very much a creature of habit. One of the bailiff's duties was
to call to order the court's daily oral argument sessions. He did this
by crying out the following command for silence and attention, the
first word of which, repeated three times, has been invoked since
the thirteenth century and the entire body of which, we were told,
had been proclaimed without fail before every session of the court
in its history: "Oyez! Oyez! Oyez! This honorable court is now in
session. All who have business before this honorable court come
round and gather near. God save the United States and this hon-
orable court." 3
Although he had opened thousands of court sessions and pre-
sumably had long since committed the words of the command to
t Copyright 0 1992 Steven R. Greenberger
* Assistant Professor, DePaul College of Law. B.A. 1976 University of Illinois, J.D. 1979
Yale Law School. The author gratefully acknowledges the comments of Alan Chen, Suzanne
Ehrenberg, Roberta Kwall and Stephen Seigel and the research assistance of Georgeann
Grabiec, James Murphy, Donna Welch', Mark Weber and Margit Livingston.
1 OuvER WE,NDELL FIcit.rviEs, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 187
(1920).
2 JOSEPH STEIN, JERRY BOCK & SHELDON HARNICK, FIDDLER ON THE ROOF 9 (1964).
3 See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 334 (4th ed.
1771); THE OXFORD ENGLISH Dic -rioNAttv 2048 (compact ed. 1971).
981
982	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 33:981
memory, the bailiff, perhaps fearful of embarrassment if his powers
of recollection were suddenly to fail him, had typed onto a notecard
the command which he dutifully read verbatim at the appointed
time. One day, however, a court clerk with whom the bailiff had
been feuding, aware of the bailiff's habitual reliance on the note-
card, got hold of it and decided to make a slight alteration in the
text, changing a word in the final sentence. Thus, when the bailiff
next rose to convoke the proceedings he solemnly beseeched God,
not to "save the United States and this honorable court" but rather,
reading directly from the card, entreated the Almighty to "save the
United States from this honorable court."
Although there was apparently some tongue-in-cheek specu-
lation by court wags that the bailiff had finally gotten it right after
all those years, he was reported to have been considerably chagrined
by his error. And our assembled group of fledgling lawyers all
enjoyed a good chuckle at his expense.
I remembered this story while thinking about Justice Scalia's
jurisprudence and specifically his approach to interpreting the Due
Process Clause. 4
 I wondered whether he could have shared the
laugh. This is not to denigrate the Justice's sense of humor; on the
contrary, he is by many accounts quite personable (unless, according
to Judge Kozinski, he is promised but not served his favorite pizza). 5
4
 There are, of course, two due process clauses in the Constitution—one in the Fifth
Amendment and one in the Fourteenth Amendment. They differ linguistically only in that
the former applies to the federal government and the latter to the states. When I refer in
the text to the "Due Process Clause," I mean the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment unless otherwise indicated. The reason for focusing on the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is that the cases in which Justice Scalia discusses due process involve state action,
although he gives no indication that his view of due process under the Fifth Amendment is
any different.
The Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes limitations on
the exercise of personal jurisdiction by the states. See infra text accompanying notes 190-95.
The Court has not addressed the issue of whether the Fifth Amendment imposes similar
limitations on the federal government, For an argument that the Cotirt should recognize
such limitations, sec Maryellen Fullerton, Constitutional Limits on Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction
in the Federal Courts, 79 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1 (1984). Professor Fullerton's argument has recently
been substantially undercut, however, by the amendments to FED. R. Cry. P. 4, which autho-
rize nationwide service of process in federal question cases. It seems unlikely that the Court
in the future will hold unconstitutional exercises of jurisdiction it has authorized by rule,
although it might strike down particular assertions of jurisdiction it deems to be especially
exorbitant.
5 See Alex Kozinski, My Pizza with Nino, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1583-85 (1991). Judge
Kozinski tells a story about the particularity of Justice Scalia's preference in pizza as a funny
but not unrevealing insight into his jurisprudence. The two jurists agreed to a lunch date,
justice Scalia agreeing to come to Judge Kozinski's chambers on the express condition that
Judge Kozinski send out for pizza from Justice Scalia's favorite pizza parlor. The lunch went
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Indeed, his amiability was said to have aided his confirmation to
the Supreme Court. 6 My question instead is whether he could have
indulged the premise without which none of us would have found
the story funny: that the bailiff's error was harmless. That premise
strikes me now, as I am sure it would have then, as unexceptionable.
What difference did it make to the court's conduct of its business
that the bailiff mistakenly said "from" instead of "and?" For that
matter, what difference would it have made had the bailiff been ill
that day and the command not been uttered at all?
The answer, of course, is "none." But self-evident though that
answer may be, it depends, at least in part, upon an understanding
as to the nature of due process, widely shared until now. Due
process has been thought to embody notions of fundamental fair-
ness. 7 The bailiff's mistake was harmless—and therefore amusing—
because it had no impact upon the court's mission of adjudication;
in no way did it compromise the fairness of the proceedings.
In a series of opinions over the past several years, however,
Justice Scalia has begun to take issue with our settled understanding
of proper due process analysis. 8 In Justice Scalia's estimation, due
process is to be assessed not with reference to notions of funda-
mental fairness, but rather by looking to traditional practice. That
is, the issue of whether a particular procedure comports with due
swimmingly, although, as Judge Kozinski tells it, the pizza was mediocre. The next time they
met for lunch, Judge Kozinski decided to educate Justice Scalia's palate by ordering pizza
from the best place in town as determined by Washingtonian magazine. Seeing the pizza was
not from his favorite parlor, however, Justice Scalia adopted a grave expression and refused
to eat it.
The moral of the story, according to Judge Kozinski, is that Justice Scalia says exactly
what he means—the pizza must come from this restaurant and no other—just as he believes
statutes and the Constitution say exactly what they mean. It is not up to the interpreter either
of the Constitution or a pizza order to decide for himself that some alternative might do the
job equally well or better. For an interesting account of the biographical roots of Justice
Scalia's jurisprudence, .see George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99
YALE L.J. 1297 (1990). Regarding Justice Scalia's textualist approach to interpretation see
the authorities collected infra note 30.
6 See, e.g., Kozinski, supra note 5, at 1585; James E. Wyszynski, Jr., In Praise of Judicial
Restraint: The Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia, 1989 DET. C.L. Rev. 117, 131; Ruth
Marcus, Judge a Favorite With Conservative Lawyers, Activists, WASH. POST, June 18, 1986, at
A 1, A 15; Ronald J. Ostrow, Style and Personality Called Contagious; Scalia Described As Persuasive,
Affable, L.A. TIMES, June 18, 1986, at 1.
The fairness principle was recognized in the context of territorial jurisdictitin in Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). For an interesting discussion of
the values inherent in procedural due process and the manner in which they should be
implemented, see Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatoty Independence and
the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455 (1986).
8 See infra Part III.
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process is to be resolved primarily (albeit in a select number of cases
not exclusively) by looking to its pedigree. If a state practice enjoyed
wide historical recognition at the time the Fourteenth Amendment
was adopted, then it is immunized from constitutional scrutiny,
irrespective of the Court's current view of its equity. 9
Justice Scalia justifies his historical approach as necessary to
prevent judges from infusing the Due Process Clause with their
own values.'" This article is a critique of both Justice Scalia's ap-
proach to due process and of his justification for that approach. 1
argue, in essence, that Justice Scalia's appeal to tradition is unwork-
able and subversive of the rule of law. It is unworkable because the
specification of the scope of a relevant historical practice inevitably
requires making a judgment about the meaning of due process
unless even insignificant departures from tradition are to be
deemed of constitutional magnitude. It is subversive of the rule of
law, because the description of adjudication as consisting merely in
the application of historical traditions excuses the need to justify
the value judgments which are actually being made and would
otherwise be difficult to defend.
This article proceeds in two parts. Part I describes Justice Scal-
ia's due process traditionalism generally and then focuses specifi-
cally upon his explication of due process in the context of territorial
jurisdiction) The topic of territorial jurisdiction is a fruitful back-
drop against which to explore his due process jurisprudence be-
cause the case in which he articulates his views most fully, Burnham
v. Superior Court,'? is a territorial jurisdiction case, because there is
a decent historical record against which to test his conclusions and,
perhaps most importantly, because territorial jurisdiction is a suf-
ficiently apolitical topic that it permits a relatively dispassionate
inquiry into jurisprudential methodology free from undue concern
about substantive outcomes. Part Il criticizes Justice Scalia's tradi-
tionalism.' 3
 I argue that his approach does not cabin judicial discre-
tion in the manner in which he contends it does because a relevant
tradition cannot be either identified or defined without reference
to values external to the tradition. I endeavor to show further that
value-free adjudication in the way Justice Scalia describes it is an
g See infra Part 113.
'° See infra Part Ili.
11 See infra notes 15-211 and accompanying text.
12 I 10 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
" See infra notes 212-71 and accompanying text.
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illusion, and that traditionalism is merely a subterfuge to permit
the smuggling into the adjudicatory process of a political agenda
without attempting to defend it. The article concludes with a brief
discussion of what the proper role of tradition in due process juris-
prudence ought to be.
The scale of my enterprise here is, in a sense, modest. I do not
propose an affirmative theory of constitutional interpretation in
rejoinder to Justice Scalia's defense of traditionalism, as phrased in
an axiom he borrows from electoral politics, that "You can't beat
somebody with nobody." 14
 I merely hope to demonstrate that, if
what it takes to be a "somebody" in constitutional theory is to render
discretionary value judgments unnecessary, then traditionalism is a
"nobody."
I. JUSTICE SCALIA'S DUE PROCESS TRADITIONALISM
A. A Methodological Curb on Judicial Discretion: Originalism
Implemented Through Categorical Rules
The elevation of Justice Scalia to the Supreme Court has been
a boon for legal academics. Although his tenure as a Justice dates
only to 1986, entire symposia have already been devoted to his
jurisprudence and decisions.° This scholarly attention sterns in part
from Justice Scalia's increasing role as the precipitator of the Court's
political transformation from liberal to conservative. It is also at-
tributable to the power and eloquence of his rhetoric which, as
Judge Posner observed concerning Justice Cardozo, may have as
much or more to do with establishing a judicial reputation as the
substance of a judge's ideas.° Perhaps most significant, though, is
the way in which Justice Scalia purports to go about doing his job.
More so than any Supreme Court Justice in recent memory, Justice
Scalia claims to apply a specific methodology of decision-making to
14 Antonin Scalia, Origination: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cm, L. REV. 849, 855 (1989).
15 E.g., Symposium, The Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. Rev. 1583
(1991); The Future of Personal Jurisdiction: A Symposium on Burnham v. Superior Court, 22
RUTGERS L.J. 559 (1991). Other articles discussing Justice Scalia's jurisprudence include:
Beau J. Brock, Mr. Justice Antonin Scalia: A Renaissance of Positivism and Predictability in Consti-
tutional Adjudication, 51 LA. L. REV. 623 (1991); Gregory C. Cook, Footnote 6: Justice Scalia's
Attempt to Impose a Rule of Law on Substantive Due Process, 14 HARV. J.L. Pun. Mil' 853
(1991); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990); Steven
R. Greenberger, Civil Rights and the Politics of Statutory Interpretation, 62 U. COLD. L. REV. 37
(1991).
16
 RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDozo: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 56-57 (1990).
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resolve cases and to apply his method irrespective of the outcome
it leads to in a particular case. For academics who devote themselves
to theorizing about adjudication, the increasingly influential adju-
dicatory methodology of a sitting Supreme Court justice can hardly
be ignored.
Justice Scalia has expounded his general jurisprudence most
thoroughly in a pair of lectures he delivered in a lecture series
dedicated to the memories of two of his distinguished predecessors
on the Court, William Howard Taft and Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr. In his Taft lecture, published as an essay entitled "Originalism:
The Lesser Evil," Justice Scalia, as the title suggests, identifies orig-
inal intent as the touchstone of constitutional interpretation. 17 He
does not, however, defend originalism by applying originalist meth-
odology. That is, he does not contend that the framers either sub-
scribed to originalism or mandated it in the Constitution. He instead
contends that originalism is necessary to curb judicial discretion
because "the main danger in judicial interpretation of the Consti-
tution—or, for that matter, in judicial interpretation of any law—is
that the judges will mistake their own predilections for the law." 19
Any nonoriginalist account of the Constitution, such as an appeal
to fundamental values, is unacceptable because judges inevitably
will view their own values as fundamental, thereby facilitating the
"judicial personalization" of the law.' 9
In his Holmes lecture, entitled "The Rule of Law as a Law of
Rules,"2° Justice Scalia describes his preferred methodology for im-
plementing originalism. Again, his concern is with "personal discre-
tion to do justice," which he contrasts with the "general rule of
law."2 ' The former is to be circumscribed by the articulation of
categorical rules to be extended as far as possible, leaving an ever
more narrow field upon which discretion may operate. While rec-
ognizing that some residual discretion may be ineradicable, those
cases are, for Justice Scalia, "a regrettable concession of defeat—an
acknowledgement that we have passed the point where 'law,'
properly speaking, has any further application."22 Where judges
turn, for example, to the totality of the circumstances as the prin-
17 Scalia, supra note 14 at 862-63.
1 Id. at 863.
19 Id.
v° Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
u Id. at 1176.
n Id. at 1182.
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ciple for decision, they are finding facts rather than expounding
law.
Of course, judges bent upon enshrining their own values in the
law could do so via the elaboration of categorical rules. Indeed,
they will have the very incentive to opine categorically that Justice
Scalia identifies in support of a rule-based jurisprudence: they will
constrain inferior judges bound to follow their lead far more effec-
tively than if they render a narrow decision limited to the case's
particular facts. In Justice Scalia's eyes such judges would be acting
improperly, however, because rules unanchored by the text of the
Constitution or a statute are nothing more than legislation. Justice
Scalia's "general rule of law" is thus inseverably tethered to origi-
nalism. 23
For Justice Scalia, then, the judicial craft consists most essen-
tially in ascertaining the precise nature of the original understand-
ing of a constitutional or congressional command and implementing
the command via the most categorical rule fashionable. Original
judicial sin occurs when judges elevate their personal predilections
to the status of law, an all but irresistible temptation unless meth-
odologically constrained. Originalism implemented through cate-
gorical rules is the methodology necessary to curb temptation and
keep the sinning in check.
B. Originalism Applied to Due Process; Traditionalism
The difficulty faced by an originalist in interpreting the Con-
stitution varies inversely with the specificity of the constitutional
provision to be construed. The more specific the provision, the less
the need to consider more than its language in order to ascertain
its meaning. There is little reason to consult the Federalist Papers
to conclude, for example, that an eighteen-year-old cannot be
elected President consistently with Article 11. 24 In contrast, the more
23 Scalia, supra note 14, at 855.
24 U.S. CoNs-r. art. II, § I, cl. 5. I choose the example of the under-aged President
advisedly. Although it would seem improbable, there is, in fact, a rather spirited academic
controversy as to whether the constitutional requirement that the President be thirty-five or
older is as clear as it seems. Cf. Anthony D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction: The "Easy Case"
of the Under-Aged President, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 250, 255 (1989) (all meaning depends upon
context, and a context can be envisioned, e.g., the death of everyone over twenty, in which
the thirty-five or older requirement should properly be ignored); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Statutes' Domains, 50 U, Cm. L. REV. 533, 536 (1983) (the age requirement might be under-
stood as "a percentage of average life expectancy ... or as a minimum number of years after
puberty"); Cary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1179 (1985)
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open-textured the provision at issue, the greater the necessity of
resorting to something more than textual exegesis alone to locate
its meaning. 25
For a good originalist such as Justice Scalia, that "something
more" is historical evidence of meaning at the time of ratification.
Done well, the task of uncovering the contemporaneous under-
standing of the Constitution in 1789 is arduous and fraught with
peril. Proper interpretation requires first surmounting the herme-
neutical hurdle of laying aside current knowledge and perspectives
to enable the modern interpreter to "enter the minds" of those who
acted in another age. 26 Then, assuming that the perspectives of the
past are accurately reproducible without suffering undue distortion
from being viewed through the lens of modernity, the actual his-
torical record itself must be assembled and assayed. As justice Scalia
suggests, this evaluation requires the review of a massive amount
of material: the expressed views of the delegates to the Constitu-
tional Convention and the members of the First Congress, the state
ratification debates, the background understanding against which
the framers were working (British practice and the state constitu-
tions) and more." It also requires some assessment of the material's
reliability. 28
Justice Scalia acknowledges, even takes pains to highlight, these
shortcomings of originalism. Indeed, the difficulty of its application,
together with an unwillingness to follow it to its logical extreme
(e.g., upholding a statute imposing flogging as a punishment if the
historical record revealed that flogging was not viewed as violative
(the age requirement might be understood as referring to a level of maturity); with Kenney
Hegland, Goodbye to Deconstruction, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1207-08 (1985) (while there may
be "arguments" against the presidential age requirement, there are no good arguments); and
Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 399, 420 (1985) ("the weird hypothetical
cases (offered by the deconstructionists1 are wildly counterfactual"). While my own view is
that the case of the under-aged President is in fact an "easy case" and therefore unqualifiedly
illustrates the assertion in the text, the conclusion would follow equally well if the case were
merely "easier" than a case which involved ascertaining the meaning of due process.
23 By an "open-textured" constitutional provision, I mean a provision that addresses the
subject of its concern broadly, implying (or indeed creating) the need for later interpretation
to bring it to life in specific situations. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 132 (1961)
(discussing the "open texture of law"). '[he quintessential examples of such a provision are
the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. Open-
texturedness is obviously a relative quality and a matter of degree. As I observe infra Part
IC, justice Scalia views the Due Process Clause, for example, as having a far more concrete
meaning than the Supreme Court has historically afforded it.
2" See ROBIN G. COLLINGWOOD, THE IDEA OF HISTORY 282-302 (1946).
2 ' Scalia, supra note 14, at 856.
28 Id.
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of the Eighth Amendment at the time of its ratification), lead Justice
Scalia to label himself but a "faint-hearted" originalist. 2° Despite this
concession, Justice Scalia ignores an additional, at least equally im-
portant defect of originalism. If the originalist undertaking is to be
of any use to a judge faced with the adjudicatory exigency of actually
deciding a specific case, then once a properly conducted historical
review is complete there must still be some principle against which
to rank the various competing "original" views which are likely to
emerge, or to command an outcome if history is silent.
Although he has not discussed this problem in either his lec-
tures or his opinions, Justice Scalia cannot be unaware of it. On the
contrary, his "textualist" approach to reading statutes, which em-
phasizes the words of a statute alone as the key to interpretation, is
explicitly premised upon the alleged impossibility of sorting
through conflicting claims of meaning in the legislative history of
mere statutes. 3° Yet it is far easier to pass upon a legislature's pur-
pose in enacting a statute than it is to decide what the framers and
ratifiers intended in a provision of the Constitution. In most in-
stances the statute will be of more recent vintage, and accordingly
there will be little or no need to step back into a different era to
understand it. Moreover, most legislative history comes reliably pre-
packaged in the form of committee reports and floor debates pub-
lished in the Congressional Record, easing the task of assembling
the necessary historical materials for review and obviating the con-
cern with accuracy. And, of course, the Constitution for the most
part was purposely scripted far more broadly than are statutes.
Justice Scalia's implicit solution to the problem of interpreting
open-textured constitutional provisions such as the Due Process
Clause in the face of an ambiguous or nonexistent historical record
is to substitute "tradition" for original intent. It is impossible to
advance this assertion with complete confidence, however, because
Justice Scalia does not say so directly. Nevertheless, in several opin-
29 Id. at 864.
" Justice Scalia has consistently decried the consultation of legislative history in the
interpretation of statutes in lieu of relying on the plain meaning of the text. See, e.g., Sullivan
v. Finkelstein, 110 S. Ct. 2658, 2667 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); Begier v. Internal Revenue
Serv., 110 S. Ct. 2258, 2267-68 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); Tafflin v. Levitt, 110 S. Ct.
792, 800-03 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring), His "textualist" theory of interpretation has
received considerable critical attention from the members of the legal academy. See, e.g.,
Eskridge, supra note 15; Greenberger, supra note 15; Michael Herz, Textualism and Taboo:
Interpretation and Deference for Justice Scalia, 12 CAttnozo L. REV. 1663 (1991); Nicholas S.
Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12 Caanozo L. Rev, 1597
(1991).
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ions over the last few years he has identified and defended tradition
as the touchstone of his due process jurisprudence, relying on the
same discretion-limiting rationale with which he justifies original-
isms'
Justice Scalia's most recent discussion of due process is con-
tained in his concurrence in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Haslip. 32 The issue in Haslip was whether excessive jury discretion
in awarding punitive damages violates the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The majority of the Court strongly
implied that in certain instances it might, but went on to uphold an
Alabama jury's punitive damages award of more than four times
the amount of compensatory damages. The Court reasoned that
notwithstanding the magnitude of the award, the jury's discretion
had been adequately limited by the trial court's instructions and the
possibility of review by the trial and appellate courts."
Justice Blackmun observed in the majority opinion that puni-
tive damages were a traditional part of state tort law, citing Black-
stone and several eighteenth-century British and American cases."
He noted that the Alabama practice of instructing the jury as to the
proper basis for awarding punitive damages, subject to post-verdict
review of the jury's decision, comported with the traditional com-
mon law approach. 35 Had Justice Blackmun stopped at that point
and validated Alabama procedure as consistent with tradition, Jus-
tice Scalia would not have found it necessary to concur. But Justice
Blackmun continued. Quoting from an earlier case, Williams v. Il-
linois, 36 he wrote, "[N]either the antiquity of a practice nor the fact
of steadfast legislative and judicial adherence to it through the
centuries insulates it from constitutional attack. . . ."37 Thus, while
the firmly rooted status of jury discretion in awarding punitive
damages in Anglo-American law was relevant in the eyes of the
majority, it alone was not dispositive. There might come a case,
Justice Blackmun observed, where a jury's decision was so extreme
as to "jar one's constitutional sensibilities."" At that point the Court
'I See infra Parts 1B and IC. In addition to the cases cited therein, see, e.g., Schad v.
Arizona, 111  S. Ct. 2491, 2505 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
32 l l I S. Ct. 1032, 1046 (1991).
"Id. at 1046.
34 Id. at 1041-42.
"Id. at 1043.
38 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
"Hasiip, I I 1 S. Ct. at 1043.
38 Id.
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would consider the matter again, even if its sensibilities had not
been sufficiently jarred in the case before it.
Justice Scalia took the majority to task for failing to affirm the
validity of jury-assessed punitive damages categorically as consistent
with "our living tradition," disparaging the Court's fact-specific de-
cision as a "jury-like verdict."" He surveyed the history of punitive
damages in England and in this country, concluding that they were
well established, if controversial, prior to the adoption of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 4 ° Jury discretion to determine the amount of
an award he saw as resting upon an equally firm footing. This
tradition of jury discretion over punitive damages by itself (with the
incidental observation that it did not violate any provision of the
Bill of Rights), he concluded, "necessarily constitutes 'due' pro-
cess."'" No further inquiry into the "fairness" or "reasonableness"
of the Alabama procedure was required or, for that matter, per-
mitted.
For a jurist who stresses the need to investigate carefully the
original understanding of a constitutional provision as the key to
interpretation, Justice Scalia's discussion of the Due Process Clause
in his opinion is remarkably perfunctory. While he rehearses the
history of punitive damages at some length, he addresses the mean-
ing of due process in a mere two paragraphs. Even then, his focus
is almost as much upon its etymology as its meaning in the Consti-
tution. Thus he cites the conventional wisdom, which relies on the
view expressed by Sir Edward Coke in the second part of his Insti-
tutes, that the phrase "due process of law" is derived from the phrase
"the Law of the Land" in Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta. 42 That
latter phrase, according to Justice Scalia's account of Coke's view,
39 Id. at 1046, 1054 (Scalia, J., concurring).
4° Id. at 1047-48 (Scalia, J., concurring).
▪ /d. at 1047 (Scalia, J., concurring).
'" Id. at 1048-49 (Scalia, J., concurring). See also EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF
THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND 50 (1642). Chapter 29 of the reissue of the Magna
Carta by Henry III in 1225, as cited by Coke (Chapter 39 in the original Magna Carta of
1215), provides: "No Freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised of his freehold,
or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will
we not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law
of the land." COKE, supra, at 45. There were several fourteenth-century statutes which
included the phrase "due process of the law" or similar references to due process which
Coke equated with the Law of the Land" in Chapter 29. For a discussion of those statutes,
see Keith Jurow, Untimely Thoughts: A Reconsideration of the Origins of Due Process of Law, 19
Am. J. LEGAL. HIST. 265, 266-71 (1975); Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on
State-Court Jurisdiction: A Historical Interpretive Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due
Process Clauses (pi. 2), 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 735, 738-42 (1981).
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referred to procedures customarily available under English law.°
References to "the law of the land" in turn occur in several state
constitutions which, in light of the wide dissemination of Coke's
views among the colonists, should be understood as incorporating
English procedure." From this, Justice Scalia implies that when the
framers included the phrase "due process of law" in the Fifth
Amendment, they intended to incorporate customary English pro-
cedures including, presumably, jury-assessed punitive damages.°
Even an originalist of strong heart, however, let alone a self-
described faint-hearted believer as Justice Scalia, should blush at
relying on a historical record this sketchy, strung together as it is
with little more than conjecture. As an initial matter, several scholars
have suggested that Coke's equation of "due process" with "the Law
of the Land" was mistaken. 46 Coke's was certainly not the original
understanding of due process of law, which apparently first meant
only proper service of process,'" a meaning which Judge Easterbrook
would prefer to ascribe to it even today." Justice Scalia thus assumes
that the framers, who were indisputably conversant with Coke's
views, acted upon them uncritically. Perhaps they did, although
there is nothing in the ratification debates which says so explicitly.°
Haslip, 1 1 1 S. Gt. at 1049; see COKE, supra note 42, at 50.
'I Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at 1049. See HERMINE HERTA MEYER, THE HISTORY AND MEANING
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 128-49 (1977); RICHARD L. PERRY & JOHN C. COOPER,
SonacEs OF OUR LIBERTIES 5-8 (1959); Whitten, supra note 42, at 745-55.
45 Haslip, III S. Cr. at 1049.
46 2 WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE.
UNITED STATES 1103-04 (1953); Jurow, supra note 42, at 271-75; MEYER, supra note 44, at
128-40; C.H. McElwain, Due Process of Law in Magna Carta, 14 CoLum. L. REV. 27,44-46
(1914).
47 Jurow, supra note 42, at 271-75. Justice Scalia acknowledges that the historical record
supports this understanding. Haslip, Ill S. Ct. at 1048.
45 Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 Sur, CT. REV. 85,90-100. Judge
Easterbrook's view that due process today should be understood as limited to service of
process, or that it was so understood by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, is
convincingly refuted in Redish & Marshall, supra note 7. Raoul Berger also takes a position
similar to Judge Easterbrook's. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 197 (1977).
49 In fairness to Justice Scalia, there is also nothing which suggests that the colonists did
riot rely on Coke's views. There is no serious scholarly disagreement that they were familiar
with Coke's position. See, e.g., RODNEY MOTT, DUE PROCESS or LAw 88-90 (1926) (remarking
that the colonists relied upon Coke). But cf. Easterbrook, supra note 48, at 96 (asserting that
"Coke was a solitary voice in English law[,)" but nonetheless acknowledging that his views
were widely known in the Colonies). There are, in reality, two different questions which
could be asked here. One question is what due process meant in the fourteenth century; the
other is what the drafters and ratifiers of the Constitution understood it to mean. For an
originalist, the former question is irrelevant; all that is pertinent is what due process meant
at the time of ratification. For a traditionalist, however, it is not so clear that the understanding
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The more serious problem with Justice Scalia's rendition of history
is that it misdescribes Coke's position. In the words of Professor
Whitten, Coke did not regard due process as "refer[ring] to any
specific procedure, but only to a general requirement of regular
procedure whereby a defendant might have the opportunity to be
heard in defense." 50
 Justice Scalia's reliance upon Coke as authority
to understand due process as authorizing or requiring any partic-
ular practice, such as a method of awarding punitive damages, is
accordingly unwarranted. Coke was more concerned with the gen-
eral availability of procedure than with its content. Because, as
Justice Scalia observes, there is no discussion of the meaning of due
process in the records of the adoption and ratification of the Fifth
Amendment, 5 t let alone a specific reference to punitive damages,
there is, accordingly, no basis for concluding that the framers in-
tended due process to apprehend anything about punitive damages.
Moreover, even if they had, there would still have to be some type
of showing that the understanding of due process did not change
between the ratification of the Fifth Amendment in 1791 and the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. 52
Justice Scalia also looks to the Court's prior decisions as a
window on the meaning of clue process. While for most other judges
the consultation of precedent under the command of stare decisis is
routine, for Justice Scalia it is unusual. As Professor Burt has ob-
served, Justice Scalia commonly vests judicial opinions with little
independent authority, viewing them as "merely judge-talk and not
necessarily taw."53 This denigration of precedential authority, is a
corollary of originalism; a prior opinion is entitled to respect pre-
of due process in medieval England should be ignored. Perhaps we should revert to what
due process traditionally (and in this instance originally) meant. This difficulty is one aspect of
the problem of identification of a relevant tradition, which I discuss in detail infra Part 11.
5° Whitten, supra note 42, at 743-44 (emphasis deleted); see also Morr, supra note 49, at
123 (observing that the colonists "looked upon due process of law as a guarantee which had
a wide, varied, and indefinite content").
5 ' Has/ip, Ill S. Ct. 1032, 1049 (1991).
52
 Although, as discussed in more detail infra note 193, the topic of due process appar-
ently received little more attention in the debates over ratification of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment than it received in the debates concerning the Fifth Amendment, there is an additional
reason not to import the eighteenth-century understanding of due process into the nineteenth
century. The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause is a restriction upon the authority
of the states rather than the federal government, and it is entirely possible that its state
ratifiers did not object to limitations on the federal government that they were unwilling to
place upon themselves.
" Robert A. Burt, Precedent and Authority in Antonin Scalia's jurisprudence, 12 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1685, 1687 (1991).
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cisely and only to the extent to which it rests upon a proper grasp
of original intent. Indeed, overruling past decisions in the service
of originalism at times seems to be Justice Scalia's understanding of
the central duty of his job description."
Prior decisions are thus theoretically of limited relevance to
adjudication, either unworthy of adherence if they do not track
original intent or essentially surplusage if they do (aside from the
rare instance where an erroneous but well-entrenched past decision
is worth abiding by because the cost of its correction exceeds the
damage it currently causes). 55 That Justice Scalia chooses to rely
upon precedent extensively in Haslip is, therefore, an implicit ac-
knowledgment of the limits of originalism. He turns to precedent
nonetheless because several of the Court's earlier cases ostensibly
lend support to the traditionalism on which he falls back.
A considerable portion of his opinion in Haslip is devoted to a
survey of the Supreme Court's standards for due process analysis
as articulated in its decisions over the last 150 years. He first cites
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 56 which identified
"settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common
and statute law of England," preferably replicated in this country
as well, as the backdrop against which to evaluate a challenged
procedure. 57 Under the rule of Murray's Lessee, if a practice was well
settled at common law, then by affording it, the government nec-
essarily provides due process. He next discusses Hurtado v. People of
California. 58 In that case Mr. Hurtado argued, citing Murray's Lessee,
that California's failure to prosecute him by grand jury indictment
denied him due process because of the grand jury's firm common
law roots. 59 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that while a
practice firmly anchored in the common law was ipso facto permis-
sible, it was not thereby rendered indispensible. 6° Justice Scalia's
pithy summary of Hurtado simultaneously captures his own ap-
proach to due process as well:
Professor Strauss has observed that Justice Scalia called for overruling five important
precedents in a period of a little over a month shortly after arriving at the Court and that
his calls for overturning cases he thinks were wrongly decided have not diminished. See
David A. Strauss, Tradition, Precedent and Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1699, 1699 (1991).
55 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2298-99 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (refusing to overrule the hundred-year-old prec-
edent of 1-fans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)).
56
 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
57 Id. at 277.
58 110  U.S. 516 (1884).
59 Id. at 528.
6° Id. at 528-29.
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Hurtado, then, clarified the proper role of history in a due
process analysis: if the government chooses to follow a
historically approved procedure, it necessarily provides due
process, but if it chooses to depart from historical practice,
it does not necessarily deny due process.'"
The ensuing task was to decide when such a departure would
violate due process. It was in resolving that issue, Justice Scalia
contends, that notions of fundamental fairness first began creeping
into the due process lexicon. He concludes that, at least until the
Court's decision in Snyder v. Massachusetts 62 in 1934, fundamental
fairness was only relevant to due process adjudication when tradi-
tional procedures were discarded, not as a standard to define what
due process consisted of generally.°
The story over the last half-century, though, is the Supreme
Court's rejection of the first axiom of Hurtado by elevating funda-
mental fairness from its limited role as a test for weighing the
constitutionality of governmental procedures which depart from
tradition, to the universal benchmark for measuring due process.
Justice Blackmun's assertion for the Haslip majority, that antiquity
alone will not insulate a traditional practice from constitutional
attack, reflects this evolution. While a hoary pedigree remains rel-
evant under modern due process analysis, the government still must
demonstrate that the challenged practice is not fundamentally un-
fair."
The modern approach is best exemplified, as Justice Scalia
suggests,65
 in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View 66 and its
progeny and Shaffer v. Heitner. 67 The Supreme Court in Sniadach
invalidated a wage garnishment statute which did not provide for
a preliminary showing of the validity of the underlying claim prior
to enforcement. 68
 Although writs of garnishment had been enforced
without such a showing for centuries, the Court was unimpressed,
holding that "[t]he fact that a procedure would pass muster under
a feudal regime does not mean it gives necessary protection. . . 
."69
• Haslip, 111  S. Ct. 1032, 1050 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
62 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
• Haslip, 111  S. Ct. at 1050-52.
64
 See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
334 (1976).
GS Ha.slip, 111 S. Ct. at 1052-53.
66 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
67
 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
69 Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 341-42.
66 1d. at 340.
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Eight years later in Shaffer, the Supreme Court struck down a sim-
ilarly venerable practice, quasi in rem jurisdiction, remarking that
"'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice' can be as
readily offended by the perpetuation of ancient forms that are no
longer justified as by the adoption of new procedures that are
inconsistent with the basic values of our constitutional heritage." 7o
Justice Scalia, of course, thinks that Sniadach and Shaffer were
wrongly decided. 7 ' It is worth specifying precisely why. It is not, or
at least not very much because those decisions are inconsistent with
the Court's older decisions in Murray's Lessee and Hurtado. As indi-
cated above, Justice Scalia views precedent as essentially irrelevant
"judge-talk." And to criticize more recent decisions for ignoring
precedent requires the critic to justify his own refusal to abide by
stare decisis and adhere to them. Nor, as we have seen, is there much
evidence that the original understanding of due process included a
methodology for its explication. Rather, the principal reason justice
Scalia rejects the modern approach to due process is its alleged
rootlessness and the attendant danger of "judicial personalization"
of the law. He thus encapsulates the reason for his disagreement
with the majority in Haslip: "[l]t is not for the Members of this Court
to decide from time to time whether a process approved by the
legal traditions of our people is 'due' process. . . . "72
To summarize, the role of original intent in Justice Scalia's
general jurisprudence is assumed by tradition in his due process
jurisprudence. The reason for the change is pragmatic. The intent
of the authors of the Due Process Clause is too murky to prevent
judges from invalidating government practices that are inconsistent
with their own view of justice. Substituting tradition for original
intent, however, is not without cost from a theoretical perspective.
That a practice is old is less of a reason to keep it than that the
framers intended that it be kept. This is not to disparage the force
of tradition qua tradition in constitutional or other adjudication, the
importance of which Justice Blackmun explicitly recognizes in Has-
lip and which I address in Part II. It is to say that where judges are
being asked, as Justice Scalia asks them, to cabin their sense of
justice and affirm what is traditional for that reason alone, it must
at the very minimum be conclusively demonstrated that the appeal
7° Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212. Shaffer is discussed in detail infra text accompanying notes
201-12.
73 Haslip, ill S. Ct. at 1053.
72 Haslip, Ill S. Ct. 1032, 1048 (Scalia, j., concurring) (emphasis added).
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to tradition is not merely a subterfuge for the importation of the
values of the traditionalist. In Part II I take- up the question of
whether Justice Scalia successfully makes such a demonstration,
after exploring his application of traditionalism to the problem of
territorial jurisdiction.
C. Traditionalism Applied to Territorial Jurisdiction:
Burnham v. Superior Court
Territorial jurisdiction is an area of the law which has vexed
the Supreme Court for over a century. Ever since it constitutional-
ized the problem by holding in the landmark case of Pennoyer v.
Neff" that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
limits the reach of state courts, the Court has struggled both to
agree upon the doctrinal underpinning for that conclusion and to
articulate a conceptual framework for the analysis of particular
assertions of jurisdiction. As to the former, the Court has vacillated,
sometimes with remarkable speed, between identifying both the in-
dividual's liberty interest in being free of the unwarranted exercise
of state power against him and the limits of state sovereignty in a
federal system as proper constitutional rationales for restricting
state court authority; 74 and at other times, holding that the individ-
ual's liberty interest is the only source of the due process limitation
of state judicial jurisdiction.75 As to a conceptual framework, the
" 95 U.S. 714 (1877). For an argument that territorial jurisdiction should never have
been subsumed within the Due Process Clause, see Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the
Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, '24 U.C.
Davis L. REV, 19 (1990). Cf. Roger H. Trangsrud, The Federal Common Law of Personal
Jurisdiction, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 849 (1989).
74 See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). The Su-
preme Court remarked that:
The concept of minimum contacts, in turn, can be seen to perform two related,
but distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant against the burdens of
litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the
States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on
them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.
444 U.S. at '291-92.
" See, e.g., Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea, 456 U.S,
694 (1982). The Court held in Insurance Corp. of Ireland, two years after its decision in World-
Wide Volkswagen, thau
The restriction on state sovereign power described in World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp., however, must he seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty
interest preserved by the Due Process Clause. That Clause is the only source of
the personal jurisdiction requirement and the Clause itself makes no mention
of federalism concerns. Furthermore, if the federalism concept operated as an
independent restriction on the sovereign power of the court, it would not be
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Court has either required or accepted as a basis for jurisdiction that
a defendant be physically served with process within the borders of
the state; 76 own property within the state; 77 consent to jurisdiction,
possible to waive the personal jurisdiction requirement: Individual actions can-
not change the powers of sovereignty, although the individual can subject
himself to powers from which he may otherwise be protected.
456 U.S. at 702-703 n.10.
The question of whether federalism should play any part in the law of personal juris-
diction has engendered a considerable scholarly controversy. Compare, e.g., Robert H. Abrams
& Paul R. Dimond, Toward a Constitutional Framework for the Control of State Court Jurisdiction,
69 MINN. L. REV. 75, 83-87 (1984) (criticizing the application of federalism to due process);
Daan Braveman, Interstate Federalism and Personal Jurisdiction, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 533, 563-
64 (1982) (interstate federalism should not limit state authority); Stephen E. Gottlieb, In
Search of the Link Between Due Process and Jurisdiction, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 1291, 1299 (1983)
(sovereignty irrelevant to due process analysis); Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Three Deaths of State
Sovereignty and the Curse of Abstraction in the Jurisprudence of Personal Jurisdiction, 58 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 699, 735-36 (1983) (criticizing reference to state sovereignty in jurisdictional
analysis); Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical
Evaluation, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 1 112, 1113-14 (1981) (federalism limitations are irrelevant to
an analysis of state judicial jurisdiction); Russell J. Weintraub, Due Process Limitations on the
Personal Jurisdiction of State Courts: Time for Change, 63 OR. L. REV. 485, 527-28 (1984)
(federalism concerns should be relegated to the 'dustbin of history); Whitten, supra note
42, at 846 (Supreme Court should reject "the notion that vindication of the status of the
states as coequal sovereigns is a proper function of due process analysis"); with Lea Brilmayer,
How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 Sup. CT. REV. 77,
84-85 (sovereignty remains a relevant jurisdictional concern); Stanley E. Cox, Would That
Burnham Had Not Come To Be Done Insane! A Critique of Recent Supreme Court Personal Juris-
diction Reasoning, An Explanation of Why Transient Presence Jurisdiction Is Unconstitutional, and
Some Thoughts About Divorce Jurisdiction in a Minimum Contacts World, 58 TENN. L. REV. 497,
529 (1991) ("sovereignty does play a significant role in due process analysis"); Terry S. Kogan,
A Neo-Federalist Tale of Personal Jurisdiction, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 257, 273 (1990) ("the conclusion
that early state courts were unconcerned with state sovereignty in invoking the personal
jurisdiction doctrine simply distorts history"); Allen R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate
Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 689 (1987) ("assertions of
jurisdiction ... ought to reflect the general limits on state sovereignty inherent in a federal
system"); Arthur M. Weisburd, Territorial Authority and Personal Jurisdiction, 63 WASH. U. L.Q.
377, 379 (same).
76 In-state personal service was one of the original bases of jurisdiction articulated by the
Supreme Court in Pennoyer. See infra text accompanying notes 182-84. Jurisdiction based
upon a court's authority over a defendant's person is known as "in personam" jurisdiction.
Whether in-state service alone remains a sufficient basis for jurisdiction when the defendant
has no other affiliation with the forum is the question Justice Scalia posed in Burnham v.
Superior Court. Burnham is discussed infra Part IC.
" The presence of property in a state is the other basis of jurisdiction recognized by the
Supreme Court in Pennoyer. See infra text accompanying notes 182-84. Jurisdiction based
upon the presence of property in the forum is known as "in rem" or "quasi in rem"
jurisdiction. True in rem jurisdiction exists when the court has the authority to dispose of
the interests of all persons in designated property; quasi in rem jurisdiction exists when the
court has the authority to dispose of the interests of particular persons in designated property.
There are, in turn, two types of quasi in rem jurisdiction. In the first type a plaintiff seeks
to vindicate a pre-existing interest in the property, such as a foreclosure on a mortgage. In
the second type a plaintiff seeks to apply the defendant's property to satisfy a judgment
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either explicitly or implicitly;" have "minimum contacts" with the
state, sometimes related to his conduct at issue in the lawsuit and
sometimes not;" "purposely avail" himself of the benefits and priv-
ileges of state law; 8° and, most recently, that the assertion of juris-
diction not transgress a more generalized test of "reasonableness.""
The presentation of the foregoing factors in the form of a
laundry list admittedly exaggerates the confusion which the Su-
preme Court's varying approaches to territorial jurisdiction has
engendered. As with most areas of the law, the Supreme Court's
approach to territorial jurisdiction has been evolutionary; not all of
the listed factors have been relevant to a jurisdictional inquiry at
the same historical time. Moreover, the broad thrust of the Court's
jurisdiction decisions since Pennoyer, at least until very recently, has
certainly been to expand the reach of state courts to reflect the
increasing. (inter)nationalization of commerce. 82
 Nevertheless, Pro-
entered in an unrelated claim against the defendant. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,
199„n.17 (1977).
78
 As the Supreme Court observed in Insurance Corp. of Ireland, discussed supra note 75,
a defendant may always affirmatively consent to jurisdiction if he so chooses. The Court also
relied for a time after its decision in Pennoyer upon the fiction of "implied" consent to enable
courts to assert jurisdiction over nonresident persons and corporations who caused injury
within the forum but did not own property there and could not be domestically served with
process, See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356-57 (1927) (out-of-state motorist held
to have implicitly consented to appointment of designated state official as agent to receive
process out of any lawsuits stemming from use of the state's roads); Kane v. New Jersey, 242
U.S. 160, 168-69 (1916) (same). The Supreme Court ultimately abandoned the fiction of
implied consent in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945),
" The minimum contacts test was promulgated by the Supreme Court in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Where a court exercises jurisdiction over a
defendant whose contacts with the forum give rise to the litigation, it is said to exercise
"specific jurisdiction." Where a court exercises jurisdiction over a defendant whose contacts
with the forum are unrelated to the litigation, it is said to exercise "general jurisdiction." See
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8 & 9. (1984). The
Supreme Court borrowed the terminology in Helicopteros from Arthur T. von Mehren &
Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121,
1144-64 (1966). See also ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN & DONALD T. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF
MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 654 (1965). The subject of general jurisdiction has received consid-
erable recent scholarly attention. See generally, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, at al., A General Look at
General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 723 (1988); B. Glenn George, In Search of General
Jurisdiction, 64 Tut.. L. Rix. 1097 (1990); Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101
HARV. L. REV. 610 (1988).
8° See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297; Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253
(1958).
81 See Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113-15 (1987); Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-78 (1985).
82
 The Supreme Court discusses the expansion of state court authority subsequent to
Pennoyer in Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 198-205 (and authorities cited therein). The high-water mark
of that expansion was McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1957),
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fessor Borchers' description of the law of territorial jurisdiction as
a "thousand-piece jigsaw puzzle" is not entirely inaccurate. 83
For a proponent of a rule-based jurisprudence such as Justice
Scalia, the desire to lend some clarity to an area of the law seized
of some confusion and governed largely by a test of reasonableness
must have been overwhelming. As a vehicle to begin to accomplish
that end, Burnham v. Superior Court, in turn, must have seemed a
godsend." At least on its face, the issue for decision in Burnham was
discrete and amenable to a definitive yes or no answer: Is a defen-
dant's physical presence in a state when personally served with
process by itself sufficient to vest the state's courts with jurisdiction
over him?" -
The facts in the case are straightforward and undisputed. Den-
nis and Francie Burnham were a married couple residing together
in New jersey with their two children." They separated and decided
where the Supreme Court sustained an assertion of jurisdiction against an out-of-state in-
surance company whose only contact with the forum was by mail. More recently, the Court
has evinced an increased willingness carefully to scrutinize exercises of state judicial authority,
particularly over defendants who merely inject a product into the stream of commerce which
happens to sweep the product into the forum state, and especially if the defendant is a
foreign corporation. See Asahi Metal Industry Co., 480 U.S. 102, 115-16 (1987) (rejecting an
assertion of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation that sold component parts to another
foreign manufacturer who incorporated the components into goods shipped to the forum);
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286, 298-99 (1980) (rejecting a claim of jurisdiction over an
automobile retailer who sold a car driven by the purchaser into a state where the retailer did
not do business).
83
 Borchers, supra note 73, at 20. See also Weintraub, ,supra note 75, at 485 (referring to
the "[c]haos and confusion" in the law of personal jurisdiction).
84 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
as J ustice Scalia defines the issue in Burnham as follows:
The question presented is whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment denies California courts jurisdiction over a nonresident, who was
personally served with process while temporarily in that State, in a suit unrelated
to his activities in the State.
id. at 2109. Justice Scalia thus frames the issue so as to require the Supreme Court either to
affirm or disavow categorically in-state personal service as a basis for jurisdiction. There is
nothing inherent in the facts of the case, however, which necessitates that the question for
decision be posed so generally. The Court might have asked whether the assertion of juris-
diction was reasonable on the particular record before it, or whether there was some reason
that the rule of in-state service ought not apply in the case, even if the Court was otherwise
inclined to affirm the rule generally. Cf. Cox, supra note 75, at 503 ("transient presence
jurisdiction . . . was unnecessary to maintain jurisdiction over the defendant in the case").
Although Justice Scalia does not acknowledge it, his choice to define the issue for decision
in such a way as to compel a categorical response is a discretionary act, which is not in any
way mandated by his invocation of tradition to resolve the issue once it has been defined.
See the discussion of the limits of traditionalism infra Part 11.
86 110 S. Ct. at 2109.
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to divorce." Francie Burnham planned to move to California, tak-
ing the children with her." The Burnhams agreed that Francie
would file to dissolve the marriage on the grounds of irreconcilable
differences when she arrived in California." Once she departed,
Dennis sought a divorce in New Jersey, alleging desertion." Al-
though he did not cause process to be issued in his New Jersey
action, he also refused voluntarily to submit to a divorce action in
Cali fornia. 9
Per their original agreement, Francie proceeded to file for an
irreconcilable differences divorce in California. 92 Later that month,
Dennis came to California to conduct business and visit his chil-
dren." Upon returning the older child home after a weekend out-
ing, Dennis was served with a summons and a copy of the complaint
in Francie's divorce action.• Several months later, he appeared
specially in the California court to contest jurisdiction." He argued
that, notwithstanding that he had been personally served with pro-
cess within the state, he lacked "minimum contacts" with California
sufficient to vest its courts with jurisdiction over him." The Cali-
fornia trial and appellate courts found that personal service within
the state was a permissible basis to sustain an assertion of jurisdiction
irrespective of the defendant's other contacts with the state, and the
United States Supreme Court agreed."
The result in Burnham was not controversial. Every one of the
Justices concurred in the judgment upholding California's claim of
jurisdiction. 98 They disagreed, at times heatedly, however, about the
correct methodology for arriving at that result.
Justice Scalia wrote the opinion of the Court, although he did
not command a majority. 99 In its hearkening back to historical prac-
87 id .
99 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 110 S. Ct. at 2109.
" Id.
99 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id,
99 110 S. Ct. at 2109,
97 Id. at 2109, 2119.
99 Id. at 2108-09.
gg Justice Scalia wrote for himself, Chief justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy and Justice
White, in part. Id. at 2109. Justice White concurred on the basis of his unwillingness to
acquiesce to Justice Scalia's traditionalism in its most extreme form—that a practice with a
lengthy pedigree always affords due process—although he thought that personal service in
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tice, its reliance upon dated precedent and its reverence for tradi-
tion, Justice Scalia's opinion resembles his concurrence in Haslip.
Yet it is far more scornful in tone of those who disagree with it, 100
and its reliance upon traditionalism in lieu of originalism is much
plainer. Conspicuous by its absence is any discussion at all of the
meaning of due process as it bears upon territorial jurisdiction or
of the thoughts of the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment on
that subject. Justice Scalia does not offer even the perfunctory nod
in that direction which he afforded in his concurrence in Haslip.
The shift from original intent to tradition in Burnham is thus a
complete one; historical practice is now the unchallenged yardstick
for measuring due process. Put differently, the states may continue
to do under the Fourteenth Amendment anything they have been
doing, provided they have been doing it for a long enough time.
Justice Scalia rests his conclusion that service of process upon
a defendant while within a state's boundaries vests the state's courts
with jurisdiction over him' or her, known in the argot of civil pro-
cedure as "transient" (or "tag") jurisdiction,m upon two grounds.
the forum state was so widely accepted as a predicate for jurisdiction that he would not strike
it down, either facially or as applied. Burnham, 110 S. Gt. at 2119. (White, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Brennan, writing for himself and Justices
Marshall, Blackmun and O'Connor, concurred in the judgment. While agreeing that service
upon a defendant voluntarily present in the state is generally sufficient to permit jurisdiction,
Justice Brennan arrived at that conclusion because he thought that the rule today is consistent
with the reasonable expectations of defendants who engage in interstate travel. Id. at 2124-
25 (Brennan J., concurring in the judgment). While tradition was relevant to the due process
inquiry in justice Brennan's eyes, it was not alone dispositive. Id. at 2120, 2122-24 (Brennan,
J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens, as is his wont, refused to join formally with
any of his colleagues, but lauded their collective views which, in his estimation, "all combine
to demonstrate that this is, indeed, a very easy case." Id. at 2126 (Stevens, J., concurring in
the judgment).
Justice Scalia remarks, for example, that "one can only marvel" at Justice Brennan's
disagreement with the pedigree of the in-state service rule, and describes Brennan's dissent
as "imperious." Id. at 2112 n.3, 2119 n.5.
101
 "Transient" (or "tag") jurisdiction refers to jurisdiction premised upon personal ser-
vice of process on a defendant within the territorial boundaries of the state in whose court
the defendant is being sued. See, e.g., Peter Hay, Transient Jurisdiction, Especially Over Inter-
national Defendants: Critical Comments on Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 1990 U.
ILL. L. REV. 593, 593. Professor Twitchell has objected to the use of the term "transient
jurisdiction" as misleading when it refers to exercises of jurisdiction following in-state service
where the defendant has significant contacts with the forum other than the mere fact of
service, e.g., he resides or conducts business there. Mary Twitchell, Burnham and Constitu-
tionally Permissible Levels of Harm, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 659, 660 n.7 (1991). Despite Professor
'Fwitchell's objection, however, the term is widely used and seems to be understood usually
to imply that the defendant is only temporarily present when served. See, e.g., Linda Silber-
man, Reflections on Burnham v. Superior Court: Toward Presumptive Rules of Jurisdiction and
Implications for Choice of Law, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 569, 569 n.3 (1991). Use of the term is
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First, transient jurisdiction has traditionally been a permissible basis
for a state court to maintain an action against a nonresident. Second,
its use is sanctioned by Supreme Court precedent, principally Pen-
noyer, which, at least in its view of transient jurisdiction, has never
been explicitly overruled. Because of the centrality of these two
propositions to Justice Scalia's enterprise in Burnham, and because
of what his method of supporting them reveals about the practical
operation of traditionalism more generally, it is worth elaborating
on their articulation and proof.
1. The Tradition of Transient Jurisdiction
Justice Scalia purports to show definitively that the in-state
service rule was "[a]mong the most firmly established principles of
personal jurisdiction in American tradition . . . at the crucial time
for present purposes: 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted." 162 He cites as evidence Justice Story's commentaries from
the mid-nineteenth centurym and a number of state court cases
sustaining the exercise of jurisdiction over temporarily present non-
residents.'" Story's assertion that transient jurisdiction was firmly
embedded in the common law, though, was premised upon his
understanding that the practice was well grounded in the legal
history of England. 1 U5 In fact, as Professor Ehrenzweig convincingly
demonstrates, there was little support for it in English tradition at
all.'°6 From a practical standpoint, because the English courts were
constituted under a single sovereign, the problem of conflicts of
authority of the sort inherent in the American federal system simply
did not arise. All English courts could at least potentially exercise
nationwide jurisdiction over the entire citizenry. 107 Accordingly,
there was no need for a domestic rule of transient jurisdiction.
There was some discussion of a transient rule in early nineteenth-
appropriate in discussing Burnham, where the Court framed the issue in terms of the con-
stitutionality of in-state service on a temporarily present defendant, although Mr. Burnham
arguably had enough contacts to sustain an assertion of jurisdiction over him had the Court
chosen to view the case as calling for an application of minimum contacts.
IU2 Burnham, 110 S. Cr.. at 2110-11.
LOS Id, at 2111. See jOSEPII STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 554,543
(1846).
" See the cases collected by Justice Scalia in Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2111-12.
'°' STORY, 51./pra•note 103.
LOB Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and
Forum Gonveniens, 65 YALE L. j. 289,297-98 (1956), See also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General
Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. CT. REv. 241,252-62.
107 See Ehrenzweig, supra note 106, at 297-98; Redish, supra note 75, at 1122.
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century English cases in an international context as, for example,
when personal service was effected upon an English subject abroad
who had defaulted and enforcement of the default judgment was
then sought against him in England.'" It was unclear even in that
setting, however, that the English courts would recognize the juris-
diction of the foreign court. 1°9 According to Professor Ehrenzweig,
the first English decision squarely to uphold transient international
jurisdiction was not rendered until well after Pennoyer. 11 °
The support for Justice Scalia's claim as to the embeddedness
of transient jurisdiction in the American legal tradition before the
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment thus coalesces into his
citation of state court authority. He lists a considerable number of
cases, most decided after 1868 (and indeed after Pennoyer), but
several decided before, which on their face appear to affirm tem-
porary presence as a valid basis for an assertion of jurisdiction.'"
Upon careful examination, however, it is not at all apparent that
those cases may collectively be read as categorically affirming tran-
sient jurisdiction in all situations, especially when understood in
historical context.
The evolution of jurisdictional rules in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries was inextricably intertwined with the concept of
the nature of causes of action. Under English practice, all causes of
action originally had a fixed thus where the event in dispute oc-
curred and were, to that extent, local—meaning that suit had to be
filed in that one locality." 2 This "local action" rule arose as a cor-
ollary of the right to trial by jury. Juries were constituted from
among witnesses to the disputed event and were expected to be
familiar with the facts. "s Of necessity, trial therefore had to take
place where the event had occurred. As the function of the jury
L"8 See, e.g., Buchanan v. Rucker, 103 Eng. Rep. 546,546-47 (1808).
10 See Ehrenzweig, supra note 106, at 298.
10 Id. The case is Carrick v. Hancock, 12 T.L.R. 59 (1895). In light of the scholarship
of Professors Ehrenzweig and Hazard, supra note 106, Justice Scalia acknowledges in Burnham
that "English tradition [concerning transient jurisdiction] was not as clear as Story thought."
Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2111. As suggested supra text accompanying note 106, that is a bit of
an understatement.
Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2111-12.
"2 See William W. Blume, Place of Trial of Civil Cases, 48 MICH. L. REV. 1,20-27 (1949);
Brainerd Currie, The Constitution and the "Transitory" Cause of Action, 73 H ARV. L. REV. 36,
66-69 (1959); Ehrenzweig, supra note 106, at 300-303; Arthur K. Kuhn, Local and Transitory
Actions in Private International Law, 66 U. PA. L. REV. 301,303 (1918); Twitchell, supra note
79, at 614-18.
"'Currie, supra note 112, at 67; Ehrenzweig, supra note 106, at 300-01.
September 1992]	 TRADITIONALISM	 1005
began to evolve toward the modern role of disinterested finder of
fact, however, the local action rule gradually began to wither. The
courts came to recognize a distinction between "local" actions, which
still had to be tried where they arose, and "transitory" actions, which
did not." 4 The category of local actions was eventually limited
primarily, although not necessarily exclusively, to disputes relating
to real property." 5 The category of transitory actions was expanded
to include almost everything else."°
The distinction between local and transitory actions is referred
to in a passage from Justice Story's Commentaries on the Conflict of
Laws which Justice Scalia quotes in Burnham: "[B]y the common
law[,] personal actions, being transitory, may be brought in any
place, where the party defendant may be found. . ."" 7 Insofar as
Justice Story asserts that by the mid-nineteenth century so-called
personal actions could be filed in places other than where the claim
arose, he is undoubtedly correct. In Potter v. Allin," 8 for example,
one of the pre-Fourteenth Amendment cases which Justice Scalia
cites, the court found that a personal, and therefore transitory,
action on a contract entered into in England could be maintained
in Connecticut because the plaintiff resided there." 9 The court held
that the cause of action for breach of contract was "a personal right
in the plaintiff, and transitory wherever he went. ',In
3" Blackstone explained the difference as follows:
In local actions, where possession of land is to be recovered, or damages for an
actual trespass, or for waste, &c., affecting land, the plaintiff must lay his
declaration or declare his injury to have happened in the very county and place
that it really did happen; but filn transitory actions, for injuries that might have
happened any where, as debt, detinue, slander, and the like, the plaintiff may
declare in what county he pleases, and then the trial must he had in that county
in which the declaration is laid.
3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at 294.
See infra text accompanying note 143.
"li See Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 F. Cas. 660 (C.C.D. Va. 1811) (No. 8,411), The local
action rule persisted as to actions relating to real estate out of a concern that a judgment not
rendered by the jurisdiction where the property was situated would be unenforceable. See
Currie, supra note 112, at 67-68. In light of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, however, that
would not seem to be a significant problem. Nevertheless, the local action rule continues to
arise on occasion even today. See, e.g., Raphael J. Musicus, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 793
F.2d 503, 509-11 (7th Cir, 1984) (recognizing but declining to apply the local action rule to
an action for fraud and breach of a lease); cf. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 217-18, (Powell,
J., concurring and Stevens, J., concurring) (evincing a concern that jurisdictional rules not
be altered to eliminate quasi in rem jurisdiction over real property).
17 STORY, supra note 103, § 554, quoted in Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2111.
u° 2 Root 63 (Conn. 1793).
119 Id. at 67-68.
1Y° Id. at 67.
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It did not necessarily follow, however, that jurisdiction would
lie wherever the defendant could be found. While that was appar-
ently the prevailing view, it was not universal. Justice Scalia's boast
that "not one American case from the period . . held, or even
suggested, that in-state personal service on an individual was insuf-
ficient to confer personal jurisdiction"' 2 ' is simply wrong. His claim
ignores local actions, in which the transient presence of the defen-
dant was irrelevant. More significantly, there are several cases in-
volving transitory actions where the courts refused to proceed de-
spite the presence of the defendant, or proceeded only over a
vigorous dissent.
The first such decision is Brinley v. Avery. "2 The case involved
a claim for breach of contract brought in Connecticut. At the time
the contract was entered into both parties resided in Nova Scotia.' 23
The defendant had subsequently moved to Connecticut, the place
of his birth, where he resided at the time the lawsuit was com-
menced.' 24 He moved to abate the action on the grounds that the
Connecticut court lacked jurisdiction over a lawsuit arising out of a
contract made and to be performed outside the state between par-
ties who were both nonresidents at the time of its execution.' 28 The
plaintiff responded that the action for breach was "personal and
transitory," and the defendant's current local residence was, there-
fore, sufficient for the court to proceed.' 28 The court agreed with
the defendant and dismissed the case.' 27
The Brinley court did not specify whether it dismissed the case
because it thought the action was local rather than transitory, in the
sense that the underlying events were tied to the locale of the
contract's execution and expected performance, or whether it
thought that there was more to establishing jurisdiction in a tran-
sitory action than the presence of the defendant.' 28 In any event,
the court concluded that even the defendant's residence in the state,
let alone mere transient presence, was not enough to vest it with
jurisdiction. 129
121 Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2112 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
122 1 Kirby 25 (Conn. 1786).
L23
 Id. at 25.
L24 Id. at 26-27.
125 Id. at 25.
126 Id. at 26.
L27 Id. at 27.
12" Id. at 26-27.
129 Id.
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The second case is Molony v. Dows. 13° An action was commenced
in New York concerning an assault which had occurred in Califor-
nia.' 3 ' The New York court refused to take jurisdiction despite local
service on the defendant, remarking that "an action cannot be
maintained in this court, or in any court of this State, to recover a
pecuniary satisfaction in damages for a wilful injury to the person,
inflicted in another State, where, at the time of the act, both the
wrongdoer and the party injured were domiciled in that State as
resident citizens."' 32 Justice Scalia notes the case and attempts to
distinguish it on the grounds that the assault was quasi-criminal in
character and the New York court was unwilling to interfere with
California's administration of its criminal justice system.' 33 While
his reading of the case is not implausible, the language of the court's
opinion does not support his conclusion directly and it is not the
reading the case was given by a New York judge who cited it in
dissent a few years later.'"
The final case is Latourette v. Clarke.' 35 Justice Scalia fails to
mention it, which is curious, considering the number of cases he
does cite and the fact that it is mentioned by Professor Ehrenzweig,
whose scholarship Scalia acknowledges.'" More so than most of the
cases Justice Scalia relies upon, which tend to invoke mechanically
the rule of transient jurisdiction without making any attempt to
explain its rationale or justify its application,'" the court in Latourette
discusses the rule at some length.'" Furthermore, the majority
opinion supports Justice Scalia's depiction of nineteenth-century
jurisdictional tradition.'" A cynic might thus wonder whether the
powerful dissent in Latourette is itself so inconsistent with Justice
' 5° 8 Abb. Pr. 316 (N.Y. C.P. 1859).
151 /d. at 316-17.
I32 Id. at 326.
I" Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2112-13 n.3.
I" See Latourette v. Clarke, 45 Barb. Ch. 327, 331 (N.Y. Ch. 1865) (Clerke, J., dissenting).
135 45 Barb. Ch. 327 (N.Y. Ch. 1865),
15° Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2111. It is interesting that while Justice Scalia accepts Professor
Ehrenzweig's criticism of Story's conclusion that the transient rule was an established part of
English tradition, he rejects Ehrenzweig's view that American courts, too, "hardly ever in
fact held transient service sufficient as such" prior to Pennoyer. Ehrenzweig, supra note 106,
at 292.
'" See, e.g., Smith v. Gibson, 3 So. 321, 321 (Ala. 1887); Murphy v. J.S. Winter & Co.,
18 Ga. 690, 691-92 (1855); Savin v. Bond, 57 Md. 228, 233 (1881); Nathanson v. Spitz, 31
A. 690, 691-92 (R. I. 1895).
1 " Lataurette, 45 Barb. Ch. at 330-31.
In See ed.
1008
	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 33:981
Scalia's boast about the absence of authority rejecting the in-state
service rule that the case was best ignored.
The facts in Latourette are essentially similar to those in Molony:
domestic service was made upon a nonresident defendant in an
action arising out of a tort committed elsewhere.' 40 The majority of
the court, while acknowledging that "some judges have expressed
an opinion that the courts could refuse to exercise such jurisdic-
tion," nevertheless permitted the case to proceed."' The majority's
primary reason for sustaining jurisdiction was the fear that the
victim would be without redress if it did not let the case go forward,
presumably because a proceeding elsewhere was either impractical
or impossible. 142
 The dissenting judge disagreed. He relied, inter
alia, on Molony, describing it as having "expressly decided that the
courts of one state have no jurisdiction between citizens of another
state for damages for personal torts, committed within the jurisdic-
tion of another state."H' He stated that the assertion of jurisdiction
over another state's citizen, "quietly and trustingly preparing to
embark in a vessel in our port for a long voyage" was properly of
"no concern" to a New York court.'" The dissent was clearly influ-
enced as well by the fact that the plaintiff was not a citizen of New
York, either, suggesting that the outcome might be different if the
court were asked to vindicate the rights of one of its own citizens.' 45
Indeed, although they tend on their face to resolve the juris-
dictional issue summarily without reference to the facts, the majority
of the pre-Pennoyer cases which Justice Scalia cites as affirming the
principle of transient jurisdiction do so in instances where the result
also serves either to facilitate recovery by a resident plaintiff, 146
 hold
"° Id. at 327-29.
141 Id. at 330-31.
"2 See id.
145
 Id. at 333 (emphasis in original) (Clerke, J.. dissenting). Both the majority and dis-
senting opinions in Latourelie emphasize that the action is ex delicto rather than ex contraciu,
implying that tort actions may be somewhat less transitory than actions on a contract. See id.
at 330-33. This view received some support in perhaps the most famous English case
involving transitory actions, Mostyn v..Fabrigas, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021, 1030 (1774), in which
Lord Mansfield expressed doubt concerning the jurisdiction of the English courts to hear a
tort action arising overseas between two nonsubjects only later casually present in England.
But see McLeod v. Connecticut & P.R. R.R. Co., 6 A. 648, 652-53 (Vt. 1886) (transitory tort
action); New Orleans N.O., J & G.N.R.R. Co. v. Wallace, 50 Miss. 244, 247 (1874) (same).
141 Lalourette, 45 Barb. Ch. at 333.
145 See id.
146 See, e.g., Roberts v. Dunsmuir, 16 P. 782, 782 (Cal. 1888); Potter v. Allin, 2 Root 63,
68 (Conn. 1793); Mussina v. Belden, 6 Abb. Pr. 165, 166 (N.Y. 1858); Vinal v. Core, 18 W.
Va. 1, 5-6 (1881).
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accountable an alien who might otherwise be difficult to reach,""
or enable a proceeding to go forward against a nonresident whose
contacts with the state are sufficiently extensive as not to render his
appearance unfair.'" For example, in Hart v. Granger, the court
nominally determined that it had jurisdiction by invoking the tran-
sient rule without elaboration." 9 A review of the facts, however,
reveals that the lawsuit was for breach of a contract entered into
within the state, brought by a citizen plaintiff, against a defendant
who lived in the state at the time the contract was made, but who
had since moved away.'°
What, then, are we to make of this historical record? Admit-
tedly, Justice Scalia cites many cases where the transient rule alone
seems to explain the outcome (although the factual recitation in
those cases is sometimes sketchy or nonexistent).'`'' His conclusion
that state courts in the nineteenth century recognized personal
service of process upon a defendant within the boundaries of the
state as sufficient to confer jurisdiction is, in general, unassailable.
They did. For that matter, most courts continue to do so today. But
it is also true that the nineteenth-century courts' recognition of
transient jurisdiction was not necessarily as ubiquitous as Justice
Scalia portrays it. And even when in-state service was formally
invoked as the ratio decidendi in a case, the result may often be
accounted for on other grounds.' 52
"7 See, e.g., Potter v. ARM, 2 Root at 65; Barrell v. Benjamin, 15 Mass. 354, 355-56
(1819).
' 48
 See, e.g., Wagner v. Hallack, 3 Colo. 176, 181-83 (1877); New Orleans N.O., f &
G.N.H.R. Co., 50 Miss. at 247; Bowman v, Flint, 82 S.W. 1049, 1050 (Tex, Civ. App. 1904);
Vinal, 18 W. Va. at 5-6.
' 49
 1 Conn. 154, 164 (1814).
19I See, e.g., Murphy v. IS. Winter & Co., 18 Ga. 690, 091 (1855).
I" See supra notes 122-50 and accompanying text. Moreover, justice Scalia's exclusive
focus upon 'jurisdiction" as a concept independent of the related doctrines of venue, forum
non conveniens and the nature of a cause of action is historically dubious. He asserts, for
example, that Gardner v. Thomas, 14 Johns. 134 (N.Y. 1817), a case in which the court
refused to take jurisdiction of a tort action arising out of an incident on the high seas between
two foreign subjects, is not inconsistent with the transient rule because the decision was based
on the doctrine of forum non conveniens, Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2112 t),3. It is not clear,
however, that the early nineteenth-century courts paid much attention to jurisdictional power
in the abstract divorced from their decision whether to entertain particular cases. Based
upon the historical record, Professor Twitcheil concludes that la[Ithough it has become
commonplace to state that early common law courts based jurisdiction on a power theory
that permitted jurisdiction over many claims unrelated to the forum . . . [the courts] only
occasionally decided disputes having absolutely no relationship with the forum." Twitchell,
supra note 79, at 018 & n.36. For that matter, because, as Professor Hazard demonstrates
and Justice Scalia concedes, there was no developed English law of territorial jurisdiction for
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Thus, assuming, arguendo, that tradition ought to constrain
constitutional interpretation, one might still legitimately inquire
whether this particular tradition is definitive enough to do so. That
the historical record surrounding transient jurisdiction even permits
this question to be posed in good faith, moreover, casts doubt not
only upon the result in Burnham, but upon the entire traditionalist
enterprise. For if transient jurisdiction, trumpeted by Justice Scalia
as "[a]mong the most firmly established principles" in our legal
tradition,'" is less well entrenched than advertised, one might ask
how useful appeals to tradition will ever prove to be. I take up these
questions in Part II.
2. The Teaching of Pennoyer v. Neff
Justice Scalia relies on more than traditionalism in the Burnham
decision. As indicated above, he also relies upon Pennoyer v. Neff '54
to bolster his argument concerning transient jurisdiction. I thus
consider Pennoyer with an eye toward whether it ultimately lends
support to the current vitality of the principle of transient jurisdic-
tion or to Justice Scalia's traditionalism more generally.
The basic facts of the case are familiar to anyone who finished
the first year of law school, but bear repeating as an aid to under-
standing the Pennoyer Court's approach to due process. The plain-
tiff, Marcus Neff, retained a lawyer named J.H. Mitchell, a shyster
if ever there was one.'" Mitchell alleged that Neff failed to pay his
bill and sued him for the unpaid balance of approximately $300 in
the state court of Oregon.' 56
 Neff then lived outside the state and
was served by publication in a weekly Oregon newspaper of denom-
the early Americans to borrow, whatever "tradition" they fashioned was, at most, little more
than half a century old at the time the Supreme Court constitutionalized the jurisdictional
doctrine in Pennoyer. Hazard, supra note 6, at 253. But see James Weinstein, The Dutch Influence
on the Conception of Judicial Jurisdiction in 19th Century America, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 73 (1990)
(arguing that American jurisdictional rules were borrowed directly from Dutch theorists).
"'Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2110.
1 " 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
155
 The personal histories of the Pennoyer cast of characters is fascinatingly retold by
Professor Perdue. Wendy C. Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal juris-
diction and Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. REV. 479, 497 (1987). See also Linda J.
Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33, 44 n.53 (1978). At
the center is J.H. Mitchell, actually the alias of one John Hippie, who had changed his name
after fleeing West with his mistress, abandoning his wife whom he had been forced to marry
after seducing her at the age of fifteen. Mitchell then left his mistress and married another
woman, without bothering to divorce his first wife. He later became a successful politician.
1"4i Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 719.
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inational circulation rather than personally.' 57 Neff naturally de-
faulted, and a tract of land he owned in Oregon was sold in exec-
ution of the default judgment which Mitchell had entered against
hirn.158 Sylvester Pennoyer took title to the land through the exec-
ution sale.' 59
Neff eventually got wind of what had transpired and brought
a diversity action in federal court to recover possession of the land,
by that time worth considerably more than $300.'"" Neff argued
that the Oregon state court had been without jurisdiction to enter
its original judgment. 16 ' The court lacked in personam jurisdiction
because Neff was not an Oregon resident, was never personally
served with process and had not voluntarily appeared.' 62 The court
lacked quasi in rem jurisdiction, Neff maintained, because Mitchell
had failed to comply with the Oregon statutes authorizing publi-
cation service on nonresident property owners.t 65 Before service
could be made by publication, Oregon law required, inter alia, proof
by the plaintiff's affidavit that, after a diligent search, he had been
unable to locate the defendant within the state.'" The law further
required that proof of actual publication be made by submission of
the affidavit of the "printer" of the newspaper.' 65
The district court held for Neff.'" Owing to the absence of
personal service, there was no argument that in personam jurisdic-
tion had been present in the original proceeding; Mitchell conceded
as much.' 67 The district court found that there had not been quasi
in rem jurisdiction either, because the affidavit to which Mitchell
attested did not demonstrate adequate diligence in attempting to
locate Neff, and because the affidavit Mitchell submitted to establish
publication was from the "editor" of the newspaper and not its
"printer."'" If that latter reading of the statutes was hypertechnical,
157 Id. at 719-20.
155 Id. at 720.
159 Id. at 719.
tau Id.
16 ' See id. at 719-20.
I ti:2
165 OR. CODE CIV. P. § 55 (1863). Relevant portions of the statute are quoted in Pennoyer,
95 U.S. at 718.
154 1d.
"s OR. Cone: Clv. P. § 69 (1863).
lea
	 v. Pennoyer, 17 F. Cas. 1279 (C.C.D. Or. 1875) (No. 10,083), aff'd, 95 U.S. 714
(1877).
'old. at 1280-81.
"H Id. at 1286-87.
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the former was defensible. The inadequacy of publication as a
means to convey actual notice was obvious and well understood,
and the need carefully to scrutinize an application for its use cor-
relatively great. 169 Indeed, it was substantially in response to the
problem of providing adequate notice that Justice Field organized
his opinion for the Supreme Court.
Justice Field agreed that the Oregon state court judgment was
void for want of jurisdiction, but disagreed with the district judge
as to the reason why. Eschewing the usual deference afforded a
trial judge's construction of state law in a diversity action,"° Justice
Field first found that any alleged defects in Mitchell's affidavit could
not support a collateral attack on the judgment because the Oregon
service of process statute only required that the affidavit be deemed
satisfactory by the judge who originally authorized notice by pub-
lication, which it obviously had.' 7 ' Justice Field was similarly un-
impressed by the argument that the termi-t`printer" as used in the
Oregon Code did not include a newspaper's editor. 172 Rather than
problems with the affidavits in the case, the jurisdictional defect
Justice Field seized upon was Mitchell's failure to attach Neff's land
at the outset of the litigation.' 73 Without such an attachment, Justice
Field reasoned, quasi in rem jurisdiction would not lie.' 74
Justice Field's conclusion that the prior seizure of Neff's prop-
erty was a prerequisite to jurisdiction has been criticized as contrary
to the practice in a number of states at the time, arguably including
Oregon, which did not require seizure as a condition of jurisdic-
tion.' 75 This criticism is accurate, in the sense that it correctly de-
169 Id. at 1287.
"'Cf. Salve Regina College v. Russell, I 1 1 S. Ct. 1217, 1223-25 (1991) (discussing, but
ultimately rejecting, the deferential standard of review historically applied to district court
interpretations of state law in favor of de novo appellate consideration). justice Field's dis-
agreement with the view of the district judge, Matthew Deady, is particularly noteworthy in
that Deady had drafted the Oregon Code at issue in the case. Perdue, supra note 155, at 491.
Moreover, even though the decision in Pennoyer long predates Eric Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938), construction of a state procedural code was certainly a matter of "local"
rather than "general" law even under the regime of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
17 ' Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. at 721.
l" See id. There was, however, apparently some disagreement among the members of
the Supreme Court on the question of whether the defects in the affidavits might be an
appropriate basis to set the judgment aside, although the majority agreed with Justice Field
that they were not. Id. at 720-21.
175 Id. at 727-28.
174 Id. at 728.
I" See Perdue, supra note 155, at 498. Professor Perdue notes that Justice Field does not
cite any authority in support of the requirement of prior seizure, which several states did
not deem necessary and which the district court judge (who, as indicated in note 170 supra,
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scribes state law, but it misapprehends Justice Field's larger point.
Justice Field was not principally worried, as his critics suggest, by
the possibility that a case might turn out to be a waste of time
without an initial seizure of the defendant's property if it later
appeared that the defendant either did not own property in the
state or had sold it before it was formally seized. 16 He was ultimately
concerned, instead, with the problem of notice. He first remarks
upon the shortcomings of notice in actions in personam:
If, without personal service, judgments in personam, ob-
tained ex parte against non-residents and absent parties,
upon mere publication of process, which, in the great
majority of cases, would never be seen by the parties in-
terested, could be upheld and enforced, they would be
the constant instruments of fraud and oppression.'"
He next cites two instances where defendants lost their property
pursuant to default judgments entered after publication only in
local newspapers. He then justifies seizure at the beginning of an
action quasi in rem as a means of providing such defendants with
notice of the proceedings:
The law assumes that property is always in the possession
of its owner, in person or by agent; and it proceeds upon
the theory that its seizure will inform him, not only that
it is taken into the custody of the court, but that he must
look to any proceedings authorized by law upon such
seizure for its condemnation and sale. "d
As a practical matter, of course, the assumption that an out-of-
state property owner will always be informed of litigation concern-
ing his property by its seizure is unwarranted. He will, however, be
had drafted the Oregon Code of Civil Procedure) did not find required by Oregon law. Neff'
v. Pennoyer, 17 F. Cas. at 1281-82; see also George 13. Fraser, jr., Actions In Rem, 34 CORNELL
L.Q. 29, 38-40 (1948); Trangsrud, supra note 73, at 874. The Supreme Court had also itself
suggested a few years earlier that the time of seizure was irrelevant. See Cooper v. Reynolds,
77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 308, 320 (1870) ("Whether the writ [of seizure) should have been issued
simultaneously with the institution of the suit, or at some other stage of its progress, cannot
be a question of jurisdiction.").
1 " Justice Field does refer to the "element of uncertainty in judicial proceedings" which
would arise absent a rule of prior seizure. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 728. As Professor Perdue
suggests, however, while the lack of certainty that they might ultimately obtain a valid
judgment might be discomfiting to plaintiffs, it is not clear why failing to seize a defendant's
property at the commencement of' a case should pose constitutional problems. Perdue, supra
note 155, at 498 n.I33.
177
 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 726.
178 Id. at 727.
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far more likely to be informed by a judicial seizure than by publi-
cation in an obscure newspaper. Aware of a jurisdictional rule re-
quiring prior seizure, the prudent owner of (real) property will, at
a minimum, appoint an agent to examine the records at the local
recorder's office regularly, to see if his property has been seized.
For our purposes, though, what is interesting is Justice Field's will-
ingness to override state practice in service of what we would de-
scribe, in contemporary due process parlance, as "fundamental fair-
ness." Prior seizure is required because it will provide better notice,
making the proceedings fairer.' 79 Justice Field's approach is to that
extent counter-traditional, both in the sense that tradition gives way
to equity and in that the federal judiciary may instruct states how
to implement jurisdictional principles.'"
In the famous part of his opinion, Justice Field turned to the
question of whether there had been in personam jurisdiction over
Neff, and held that there had not. This portion of the opinion was
technically dicta. Mitchell had conceded the issue in the district
179 Professor Perdue argues at one point that Justice Field was not principally concerned
with the problem of notice because the Pennoyer opinion is a "disaster" on that point, a
characterization she borrows from Professor Hazard. Perdue, supra note 155, at 496-97
n.I27, citing Hazard, supra note 106, at 261-62, 270. What this characterization apparently
refers to is that Justice Field's equation of seizure with notice ironically served to reduce the
chance that a defendant would receive actual notice once service by mail became more
common. See John N. Drobak, The Federalism Theme in Personal Jurisdiction, 68 IowA L. Rev.
1015, 1029 n.67 (1963); Hazard, supra note 106, at 252 n.35. But Justice Field's inability to
forecast the evolution of modes of service of process does not establish that he was not
concerned with the problem of notice. On the contrary, his concern is very evident from the
passages of the opinion quoted in the text. Moreover (as Professor Perdue observes), Pro-
fessor Hazard identified the notice problem as Justice Field's major concern, even if his
attempt to deal with it ultimately proved inadequate. Hazard, supra note 106, at 269-70.
Accord Drobak, supra at 1029 n.67; Trangsrud, supra note 73, at 875 n.34. There is also the
curiousness of Justice Field's requirement that property be attached prior to the commence-
ment of an action. As discussed earlier, there was no authority requiring seizure, and the
presence of property in a state should itself confer jurisdiction on the state's courts to proceed,
even if a judgment might prove uncollectable if the property were removed prior to execu-
tion. This is precisely what occurs pursuant to an assertion of transient in personam juris-
diction. In-state service confers jurisdiction at the outset of the case, which continues in force
irrespective of whether the defendant remains in the forum thereafter. See Silberman, supra
note 155, at 45-46. Attachment does, however, afford the defendant the possibility of better
notice. But see Silberman, supra note 155, at 46-47. (asserting, without elaboration, that a
concern with notice is not a "persuasive explanation for Justice Field's requirement of
attachment," but perhaps meaning that attachment does not satisfactorily solve the notice
problem, not that it was not Justice Field's attempt to do so).
'H 4 See Trangsrud, supra note 73, at 875. It was on the question of the federal courts'
authority to mandate state procedure that Justice Hunt dissented. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 737-
38, 748 (Hunt, J., dissenting). The implications of Justice Hunt's dissent for the traditionalism
of Justice Scalia are discussed infra text accompanying notes 196, 197.
September 1992]	 TRADITIONALISM	 1015
court, and Oregon law in any event did not allow an assertion of in
personam jurisdiction against a nonresident not served with process
within the state's borders.' 81 Justice Field nevertheless availed him-
self of the opportunity to expound the framework which was to
govern jurisdictional analysis until at least the middle of the twen-
tieth century. He began by identifying "two well-established prin-
ciples of public law respecting the jurisdiction of an independent
State over persons and property." 182 First, "every State possesses
exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property
within its territory."'" Second, "no State can exercise direct juris-
diction and authority over persons and property without its terri-
tory." 184 Personal jurisdiction was thus a function of each state's
sovereign power over its own territory. A state had jurisdiction over
its residents, those served with process domestically, and those who
appeared voluntarily and over property within its borders (as long
as it seized the property before asserting jurisdiction). It had no
jurisdiction over anyone or anything else.
In articulating his jurisdictional vision, Justice Field had a num-
ber of formidable analytical hurdles to surmount. There was, as an
initial matter, the absence of supporting authority. Justice Field
adopted his "public law" principles from Justice Story, 185 who had
borrowed them from a Dutch scholar, Ulrich Huber.' 86 Huber de-
veloped the principles with reference to international law, although
the examples he offered as illustrations were drawn from the rela-
tions of the federated Dutch provinces inter se, which at the time in
their political configuration resembled the American states.' 87 The
pre-Pennoyer case law that incorporated those principles conse-
quently arose entirely as a problem of the interstate recognition of
'"' Neff, 17 F. Gas. at 1280-81.
182
 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722.
'" Id.
184 Id.
185 Id.; we SToxy, supra note 103, 1§,
 17-23. Justice Story's version of the public law
principles of judicial jurisdiction is set out and analyzed in Hazard, supra note 106, at 260.
Justice Story also relied upon the principles in Piquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609 (C.C.D. Mass.
1828) (No. 11,134) decided several years before publication of his treatise. See id. at 259-60.
'"" See Ercnst G. Lorenzen, Huber's De Conflictu Legum, 13 ILL. L. REV. 375 (1919);
Kurt H. Nadelman, Joseph Story's Contribution to American Conflicts Law: A Comment, 5 Am. J.
LEGAL HIST. 230-31 (1961).
I" See Lorenzen, supra note 186, at 377. The importance of Continental legal theory in
the early development of American law is also reflected in Alexander Hamilton's and James
Madison's discussion of the relevance of the Dutch federation to the construction of our
federal union in The Federalist No. 20, noted in Drobak, supra note 179, at 1027 n.60,
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judgments under the Full Faith and Credit Clause and statute.'"
The issue in Pennoyer, however, was not whether Justice Field's
principles governed the decision of some state other than Oregon
to recognize the original Oregon judgment and give it full faith and
credit. The issue was, rather, whether those principles could regu-
late Oregon's decision to give its own judgment intrastate recognition.
Justice Story and Huber were of no help on that point.'"
Justice Field's solution to the intrastate recognition problem
was to look to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."' Invoking the Due Process Clause, though, raised additional
obstacles. One impediment, which Justice Field either overlooked
or ignored, was that the Fourteenth Amendment was not ratified
until after the relevant events in the case had already transpired.'"
'" The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution provides:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records
and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by General
Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall
be proved, and the Effect thereof.
U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1.
The full faith and credit statute implements the constitutional requirement by providing
that judicial proceedings "have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the
United states, as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state from whence the said
records are or shall be taken." Act of May 26, 1790, ch. II, I Stat. 122 (current version at
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988)).
Prior to Pennoyer, the Supreme Court had to decide whether the Full Faith and Credit
Clause and statute allowed for a collateral attack on a judgment in a state where the judgment
was sought to be enforced on the ground that the rendering court lacked jurisdiction over
the defendant. In D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165 (1850), the Supreme Court
held that the command of full faith and credit had not altered "the well-established rules of
international law, regulating governments foreign to each other," which permitted such
attacks. Id. at 174. The Court later made it clear, however, that the full faith and credit
requirement, as the text of the Constitution and statute make plain, applies only to the
question of the extent of recognition a judgment need be given by another state, and is not
in any way a limitation on the effect the rendering state may give its own judgment. In
Galpin v. Page, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 350, 369 (1873), Justice Field, writing for the Court,
confirmed that states were empowered to enact jurisdictional rules beyond the principles of
"public international law," although the Court would carefully review broad jurisdictional
assertions to ensure that the states complied with their own jurisdictional statutes.
' 8" justice Field acknowledges in Pennoyer, that previous cases implied that a judgment
not entitled to full faith and credit outside the state because it was rendered without juris-
diction could nevertheless be given effect within the state. 95 U.S. at 732.
' 9° Id. at 733.
Justice Field notes that the default judgment in the case was entered in February,
1866. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 719. The Fourteenth Amendment was not ratified until July 1868,
more than two years later. No. 13, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 15 Stat., app. at 708-09 (1868). In
light of justice Field's assertion that jurisdiction had to attach at the time an action was
commenced, the gap between the assertion of jurisdiction and the ratification of the Four-
teenth Amendment was, in reality, even larger. See supra text accompanying note 175. Several
commentators have noted that Justice Field's invocation of the Due Process Clause was
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More importantly, there was little formal support for equating ju-
risdiction with due process. The best evidence of the common law
understanding of due process suggests that it was not thought to
restrict the states' ability to enact rules inconsistent with accepted
notions of territorial jurisdiction, irrespective of the fact that other
states would not be obligated to enforce judgments rendered in
contravention of those notions. 192 And there is certainly nothing in
the Fourteenth Amendment ratification debates suggesting either a
limitation on state power to fashion jurisdictional rules or that due
process was intended to enshrine principles of territorial jurisdiction
generally.'"
On what basis, then, did Justice Field invoke the Due Process
Clause? The answer is our old friend, "fundamental fairness." If,
as Justice Field demonstrates, a judgment rendered without juris-
diction was unenforceable in other states because "contrary to the
first principles of justice,"'" then it is hard to see why it should
nevertheless be enforceable in the state which rendered it. Not to
extend the jurisdictional requirement to the rendering court seems
"fundamentally unfair," and the Due Process Clause is the logical
source to remedy the unfairness. Thus, in this author's view, Justice
Field ultimately reads his jurisdictional framework of territorial
sovereignty into the Due Process Clause as part of an effort to
ensure fairness to defendants.L 95
technically dicta. See, e.g., Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The "Forum State Interest" Factor in Personal
Jurisdiction Adjudication: Home-Court Horses Hauling Constitutional Carts, 33 MERCER L. REV,
769, 773-74 (1982); Redish, supra note 75, at 1115 n.25.
' 92 See, e.g., Whitten, supra note 42, at 804. See also supra notes 188, 189.
l" There was apparently little discussion of the meaning of due process in the Fourteenth
Amendment by its framers. Their principal concern was with the meaning of the guarantee
of equal protection. See Mori., supra note 49, at 164; JACOBUS TENBROER, THE AN'I'ISLAVERY
ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 187-90 (1951); Redish, supra note 75, at 1124-
25; Whitten, supra note 42, at 804-21. The most noteworthy remark in the debate was
offered by the Amendment's author, Representative Bingham, who answered in response to
a question as to the meaning of due process that "the courts have settled that long ago, and
the gentleman can go and read their decisions." Mori-, supra note 49 at 164; Redish, supra
note 75 at 1124-25 11.91; Whitten, supra note 42, at 810. Professor Whitten expresses the
scholarly consensus that "[dt does not seem plausible ... that the Fourteenth Amendment
originally imposed the traditional rules of international territorial jurisdiction on the states
directly through the due process clause." Whitten, supra note 42, at 821.
"94 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 732.
Professor Lewis offers additional support for this reading of Pennoyer. While conced-
ing that the concept of sovereign territorial authority is central to the decision, he asserts
that the "stress on sovereignty in the Pennoyer opinion appears as a way of defining the due
process rights of litigants, rather than as a suggestion that the challenged state judicial fora
had any claim on due process of their own." Lewis, supra note 191, at 773. Professor Lewis
reaches this conclusion by comparing Justice Field's approach to the due process issue, which
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Justice Scalia's reliance upon Pennoyer in Burnham is thus pro-
foundly ironic. He wants to extract the jurisdictional rules from
Pennoyer, especially the rule that in-state service necessarily confers
jurisdiction, while ignoring Justice Field's reason for incorporating
those rules into due process in the first place.' 96 Indeed, had Justice
Scalia been on the Court when Pennoyer was decided and applied
his traditionalism consistently, he would doubtlessly have joined
Justice Hunt's dissent on the grounds that it was traditionally a
prerogative of the states to determine for themselves what the ap-
propriate reach of their courts should be; and the Fourteenth
Amendment was, therefore, entirely irrelevant to the issue of per-
sonal jurisdiction. Justice Scalia's extolling of the rule of Pennoyer
while rejecting its rationale of fairness evinces, at a minimum, an
extraordinarily formalistic approach to precedent.
focuses on "judicial proceedings ... for the protection and enforcement of private rights," with Justice
Hunt's focus on the forum's legislative power. Id. at 774 (quoting Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733
(emphasis supplied by Lewis)). He concludes:
Thus, the Court in 1878 explicitly recognized that the process that is due in
judicial proceedings involving private disputes is due to individual litigants, not
to the forum—hardly a surprising interpretation of a provision in the fourteenth
amendment that speaks in prohibitory terms to the states and enjoins them not
to deprive any 'person' of property without due process. The repeated refer-
ences in Pennoyer to state sovereignty really only give content to the process due
individual parties.
Id.; accord Drobak, supra note 179, at 1029 n.68.
This understanding of Pennoyer is, concededly, controversial. Numerous scholars have
viewed the limits of state sovereignty, rather than a concern with fairness to the litigants, as
not only the measure of personal jurisdiction established by Pennoyer, but as the rationale for
Justice Field's opinion in Pennoyer as well. See, e.g., Stewart Jay, Minimum Contacts as a Unified
Theory of Personal Jurisdiction: A Reappraisal, 59 N.C. L. REV, 429, 474 (1981) ("more funda-
mental aspect of Pennoyer was its insistence that constitutional limitations on jurisdiction to
adjudicate were a function of the constraints associated with a federation of sovereigns
retaining independent judiciaries"); Kenneth F. Ripple & Mollie A. Murphy, World-Wide
Volkswagen: Reflections on the Road Ahead, 56 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 65, 70 ("while Pennoyer
established the presence test, its fundamental concern was state sovereignty"); Allan R. Stein,
Burnham and the Death of Theory in the Law of Personal jurisdiction, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 597, 600-
01; cf. Kogan, supra note 75, at 331-42 (describing Pennoyer as "Janus-faced," reflecting
concerns both with individual rights and traditional sovereign power).
For the limited purpose of analyzing Justice Scalia's due process traditionalism in Burn-
ham, however, it is unnecessary definitively to characterize Justice Field's opinion as an attempt
to protect defendants, to constrain state power, or as some combination of the two. The
existence of a scholarly disagreement over its rationale over a century after the case was
decided is in itself sufficient reason not to invoke Pennoyer uncritically as a contemporary
guide for decision.
' 96 See Stein, supra note 195, at 600-01 (contrasting Justice Field's attempt "to construct
a normative model of judicial legitimacy" with Justice Scalia's view that due process merely
"guarantees judicial conformity with historical practice").
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In any event, virtually from the day Pennoyer was handed down,
the Supreme Court gradually but systematically began to chip away
at Justice Field's jurisdictional edifice. Justice Field's second princi-
ple, that a state's jurisdictional authority is limited to persons and
property within its borders, was the first to erode. The precipitating
event was the invention and mass production of the automobile,
which vastly increased the number of cases with interstate ramifi-
cations.'`" For a time the Supreme Court endeavored to work within
Pennoyer's framework and relied upon the fiction of "implied con-
sent" to permit a state to take jurisdiction over nonresident motorists
who caused injury in the state but could not be locally served with
process.'" Eventually, however, the fiction collapsed of its own
weight and the Supreme Court formally discarded it in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 199 which expanded the reach of state courts
to cases against defendants who had "minimum contacts with [a
state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice,'" even if they had
not been served within the state or their consent to suit could not
in some manner be "implied." 20°
Justice Field's first principle, that a state enjoys untrammeled
authority over persons and property within its territory, withered
more slowly. At least prior to Burnham, however, its ultimate demise
also seemed inevitable. In Shaffer v. Heitner the Supreme Court held
that the mere presence of property within a state was no longer
sufficient to permit jurisdiction over the property's owner, essen-
tially the same fact pattern presented in Pennoyer. 20 ' The Court
opined that "all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be eval-
uated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and
197 See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 202 (1977) (noting that "Whe advent of auto-
mobiles, with the concomitant increase in the incidence of individuals causing injuries in
States where they were not subject to in personam jurisdiction actions under Pennoyer, required
further modification of the territorial limits on jurisdictional power").
198 See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). TI.e Supreme Court also sanctioned use
of the implied consent fiction to enable state courts to effect service of process upon foreign
corporations. The application of the fiction to corporations proved difficult to administer,
though, because it required a threshold finding that a corporation was "doing business" in
the state, a more complex task than merely finding that a nonresident had used the state's
roads. Indeed, that inquiry was essentially another way of asking whether the corporation
had sufficient contacts that it was just that the corporation be haled into court, which is the
test the Court ultimately settled on in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
321 (1945),
'gg 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
to° Id. at 316.
20 ' 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).
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its progeny. " 202 There was no reason to think that the Court's use
of the word "all" did not include assertions of jurisdiction based
upon the presence of the defendant as well as his or her property,
and the commentators who wrote about Shaffer concluded over-
whelmingly that it presaged the end of transient jurisdiction. 2"
Justice Scalia attempts in Burnham to save the transient rule
from the logic of Shaffer, but his effort is utterly unconvincing. 204
He essentially argues that Shaffer should be confined to its facts,
that it addressed only the situation where the minimum contact of
property ownership is substituted for the physical presence of an
absent defendant. 2°5 Physical presence, he maintains, is the para-
digm against which the minimum contacts rule was fashioned, and
it would be perverse to jettison it in favor of a standard that was
intended as its substitute. 206
But this limited reading of Shaffer wrenches the case from the
historical context in which it was decided. Shaffer was the apogee of
the Supreme Court's rejection of the jurisdictional theory of Pen-
noyer. The Court looked to minimum contacts analysis as a theoret-
ical alternative to the sovereign territorialism of the states, not as
an application of it. Justice Brennan captures this lesson in his
Burnham dissent:
2" Id.
"3 Daniel 0. Bernstine, Shaffer v. Heitner; A Death Warrant for the Transient Rule of In
Personam Jurisdiction, 25 V1LL. L. REV. 38, 61-62 (1979-80); Cox, supra note 75, at 503; Jack
H. Friedenthal, A Comment on the Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner in the Classroom, 1978 WASH.
U. L.Q. 319, 320; Donald W. Fyr, Shaffer v. Heitner: The Supreme Court's Latest Last Words on
State Court Jurisdiction, 26 EMORY L.J. 739, 770 (1977); Jay, supra note 195, at 474; Frank R.
Lacy, Personal Jurisdiction and Service of Summons After Shaffer v. Heitner, 57 OR. L. REV. 505,
508-09 (1978); Harold S. Lewis, jr., A Brave New World for Personal Jurisdiction: Flexible Tests
Under Uniform Standards, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1, 60-61 (1984); Bruce Posnak, A Uniform Approach
to Judicial Jurisdiction After World-Wide and the Abolition of the "Gotcha" Theory, 30 EMORY L.J.
729 (1981); Ripple & Murphy, supra note 195, at 76-77; Robert Allen Sadler, Judicial Juris.
diction and Choice of Law in Interstate Accident Cases: The Implications of Shaffer v. Heitner, 1978
WASH. U. L.Q. 329, 332; David H. Vernon, Single-Factor Bases of In Personam Jurisdiction—A
Speculation on the Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner, WASH. U. L.Q. 273, 303; Weintraub, supra note
75, at 492; Donald J. Werner, Dropping the Other Shoe: Shaffer v. Heitner and the Demise of
Presence-Oriented jurisdiction, 45 BROOK. L. REV. 565, 606 (1979). But see Earl M. Maltz,
Sovereign Authority, Fairness and Personal Jurisdiction: The Case for the Doctrine of Transient
Jurisdiction, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 671 (1988) (arguing that transientjurisdiction survived Shaffer).
20 ' For critiques of Justice Scalia's treatment of Shaffer, see Cox, supra note 75, at 506-
08 & n.42, 539-47; Martin H. Radish, Tradition, Fairness, and Personal jurisdiction: Due Process
and Constitutional Theory After Burnham v. Superior Court, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 675, 679-81
(1991).
2°5 Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2115-16.
206 Id.
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The critical insight of Shaffer is that all rules of jurisdiction,
even ancient ones, must satisfy contemporary notions of
due process. No longer were we content to limit our ju-
risdictional analysis to pronouncements that '[t]he foun-
dation of jurisdiction is physical power,' and that 'every
State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over
persons and property within its territory . .' While our
holding in Shaffer may have been limited to quasi-in-rem
jurisdiction, our mode of analysis was not.... International
Shoe and Shaffer . .. mean that every assertion of state-
court jurisdiction, even one pursuant to a 'traditional' rule
such as transient jurisdiction, must comport with contem-
porary notions of due process. 207
Justice Scalia acknowledges that the Supreme Court in Inter-
national Shoe properly discarded Justice Field's second principle that
a state could not act outside its territory. 2°8 But in the face of this
acknowledgment, it is impossible to argue consistently for the con-
tinuing vitality of Justice Field's first principle. Both principles flow
from the identical theory of territorial sovereignty. They cannot
logically be decoupled, one rejected and the other accepted. 2°9 And
even if one were persuaded of the virtue of unlinking them, Justice
Scalia offers no warrant for applying the first principle of sovereign
territoriality to people but not to their property.m
Perhaps mindful that his opinion in Burnham is less than faith-
ful to the rationale of Shaffer, Justice Scalia candidly concedes that
his methodology is not the same. He writes in explanation:
[W]hile our holding today does not contradict Shaffer, our
basic approach to the due process question is different.
We have conducted no independent inquiry into the de-
2°2 Id. at 2120-22 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2°' Id. at 2114.
2°9 Accord Cox, supra note 75, at 541-42; Relish, supra note 204, at 679-8i; Stein, supra
note 195, at 601.
21 " Professor Stein suggests that it is possible to make an argument for treating power
over persons and power over their property differently, although he does not necessarily
subscribe to it. The argument would run that the fairness of jurisdiction depends upon the
volitional contact of a defendant with the forum. A defendant has more control over where
he travels than over the location of his property, especially intangible property. This is
exemplified by the facts in Shaffer, where the governing Delaware law provided that the sites
of all shares in a Delaware corporation—including those owned by out-of-state residents—
was Delaware. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 192. Hence, there may be a reason to analyze jurisdiction
based upon the presence of an individual and the presence of his property differently.
Whatever the virtues of this argument, however, it is not, as Professor Stein points out, an
argument which Justice Scalia thought necessary to offer. See Stein, supra note 195, at 603.
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sirability or fairness of the prevailing in-state service rule,
leaving that judgment to the legislatures that are free to
amend it; for our purposes, its validation is its
pedigree. . The short of the matter is that jurisdiction
based on physical presence alone constitutes due process
because it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal
system that define the due process standard of 'traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.'2 "
Justice Scalia has thus distilled his theory of due process down
to its essence. The process which is due is that which the states have
traditionally afforded. Departures from tradition are possible, but
that is up to the states. So long as they adhere to tradition, they do
not run afoul of the Constitution. The role of the federal courts is
merely to ascertain the content of the relevant tradition and ensure
that the states comply with it. No normative inquiry into the char-
acter of the tradition is required or permitted.
It is now time to see whether Justice Scalia's theory presents a
workable alternative to the judicial subjectivism he so roundly con-
demns.
II. THE LIMITS OF TRADITIONALISM
In many respects, tradition is the fundamental ordering prin-
ciple of our lives. Much of what we believe, feel, do and say is
unscrutinized and reflexive, a product of the historical accumulation
of practices conveyed to us as part of our acculturation as members
of human society. The impartation of tradition to us, and our
incorporation into it, begins with birth and does not end even when
we die; the acts we perform in life become part of tradition itself,
passed on to those who succeed us. Appeals to tradition are accord-
ingly powerful, for they touch very closely on a substantial part of
that which makes us what and who we are. It is not surprising that
they occupy a central place in the creation and interpretation of
law.
The realms of law and tradition overlap considerably. Much of
what we call law is codified tradition, practice and belief turned into
formal rules. At the same time, law and tradition are not congruent.
Legal rules are, indeed, often fashioned precisely in order to reg-
ulate tradition, especially when it is noxious or abhorrent, the most
obvious instance of such regulation being the criminal law. The
211 Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2115, 2116.
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relationship between law and tradition is thus variegated and com-
plex; tradition is both a building block of law and an object which
law seeks to control.
It follows, I think, that an attempt to define legal norms solely
with reference to tradition, even tradition as embodied in prior
legal rules, is doomed to fail as a theoretical matter. 212 It is for this
reason, perhaps, although it assuredly has something to do with the
need of a sitting Supreme Court Justice to decide individual cases,
that Justice Scalia does not offer a comprehensive defense or ac-
count of the role of tradition in law. As indicated in Part I, his case
for traditionalism is narrowly pragmatic: It will keep activist judges
in line.
Justice Scalia advocates traditionalism as an ostensibly neutral
principle, in the sense that conservative judges will be bound to
uphold liberal traditions with which they disagree just as liberal
judges will be bound to uphold conservative ones. There is, how-
ever, a normative premise to his argument; he thinks that restrain-
ing judges is a good thing, partly out of a preference for majori-
tarian decision-making and partly because it will retard the overall
pace of social change:2 P' And this latter effect in particular dovetails
nicely with his conservative political leanings. The criticism princi-
pally worth offering, though, is not that appeals to tradition are
backward-looking and tend to enshrine the status quo, which is
obvious. The important point is that traditionalism is not neutral
on its own terms, because it cannot be applied without resort to the
value-laden discretionary judgments it is said to eliminate. This can
be seen from an examination of the two principal methodological
problems inherent in traditionalism: how to identify a controlling
tradition, and how to define one. This section explores those ques-
tions and then concludes with a discussion of the appropriate role
of tradition in due process adjudication.
A, The Problem of Identification
The first problem with traditionalism is that, as with any ad-
judicatory methodology, it contains no self-referential rule of ap-
plication. The world is generally full of differing and often conflict-
212 For an elegant defense of the role of tradition in law see Anthony T. Kronman,
Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029 (1990). For an incisive reply see David Luban,
Legal Traditionalism, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1035 (1991). See also Burt, supra note 53; Strauss, supra
note 54.
2" Scalia, supra note 14, at 862-64; Scalia, supra note 20, at 1176.
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ing practices of varying force and antiquity. So is the law. How do
we know when one of these putative traditions is the real thing?
Justice Scalia does not tell us.
To begin, consider the hermeneutical objection mentioned
briefly in Part I, that the historiography necessary to locate a tra-
dition inevitably involves the coloration of the past by the perspec-
tive of the present. On the whole Justice Scalia is correct that the
concern with this objection tends to be somewhat overblown. 214
Reconsider for a moment, though, the appropriate "tradition" to
be derived from the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century state cases
which discuss transient jurisdiction. As we know, Justice Scalia finds
that those cases "firmly establish" transient jurisdiction as a funda-
mental principle of American law. 215 His conclusion arguably rests,
however, upon a misapprehension of the mindset of the courts of
that era. As we have seen, until well into the nineteenth century,
courts used to recognize a distinction, no longer of great impor-
tance, between local and transitory actions. 216 It was only in the
latter type of case that the fleeting presence of a defendant might
serve as a basis for proceeding against him. Moreover, at least some
courts refused to assert jurisdiction over a casually present defen-
dant even though the suit may have been characterizable as tran-
sitory. 2 " Understood in historical context, then, it is not so clear
that when the courts upheld transient jurisdiction in "transitory"
actions they were endorsing it across the board, and certainly not
in its most extreme form: a lawsuit brought by one nonresident
against another nonresident over a tort committed elsewhere. Fur-
ther, even when a court nominally invoked the transient rule, its
decision could often be explained on other grounds."' Contem-
porary approaches to jurisdiction, which no longer pay significant
attention to historical distinctions once thought consequential, may
thus have blurred Justice Scalia's vision of the past.
More significant than the difficulty of looking backward accu-
rately is the question of what to make of historical evidence once it
is accumulated. Justice Scalia's methodology does not indicate the
nature or quantum of evidence necessary to comprise a "tradition."
Is his description of his understanding of the historical record in
2" See Scalia, supra note 14, at 864.
2" Built/tarn, 110 S. Ct. at 2110-13.
2 ' 6 See supra text accompanying notes 112
-20.
2" See supra text accompanying notes 122
-46.
2 " See supra text accompanying notes 147
-50.
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Burnham, that no nineteenth-century court "even suggested" that
local service would not confer jurisdiction, the standard against
which a historical record is to be measured? 219 Does even a single
counterexample preclude identification of a tradition? If so, then
applying traditionalism is a waste of time; Burnham itself seems not
to measure up. If not, then justice Scalia gives no indication of
what yardstick judges should apply in the usual case where the
historical evidence is confused and conflicting. Judges will, perforce,
make their own discretionary assessments of whether a tradition
has been established.
Finally, even if a consensus could be reached as to how much
evidence is required to constitute a tradition, judges must still sub-
jectively determine what the evidence means. This is most com-
monly a problem when looking to tradition captured in judicial
precedent. Recall the previous discussion of how we should under-
stand the teaching of Pennoyer 2" Justice Scalia maintains that Pen-
noyer established that presence is the paradigm of all jurisdiction.
The decision continues to be relevant in his eyes because justice
Field's first principle of presence, dicta in the case, has never been
explicitly overruled as applied to persons. The alternative view is
that Pennoyer is primarily a case about fairness to defendants, re-
flected in its concern with adequate notice. Justice Field's reliance
upon principles of territorial sovereignty is on this account inciden-
tal to his larger purpose of ensuring fairness, although perhaps
inescapable in light of the nineteenth-century understanding of the
relationship of geography to power. 221 But as that understanding
changed due to the expansion of interstate commerce, there was
no longer any reason to follow slavishly the original principles if,
as was often the case, they led to outcomes inconsistent with the
underlying rationale of fairness. 222 The theory of territorial sover-
eignty was then ultimately rejected in Shaffer, which involved the
same type of jurisdiction—quasi in rem—as did Pennoyer.
Identifying the jurisdictional "tradition," if any, which Pennoyer
and the cases following it help to establish without making some
sort of judgmental choice between these alternative understandings
is impossible. There is no a priori obvious rule to be gleaned. This
2 " Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2112.
22" See supra text accompanying notes 175-207.
22 ' See Terry S. Kogan, Geography and Due Process: The Social Meaning of Adjudicative
Jurisdiction, 22 RuTGEtts L. REV. 627 (1991).
222 See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212.
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does not mean that the choice must be made arbitrarily. Resort may
be had to all of the various forms of reasoning judges commonly
use to decide cases. 225 But it is plainly wrong to claim that instructing
judges to canvass a historical record to ldcate and apply tradition
relieves them to any substantial degree of the need to make the
same type of judgments they would ordinarily.
B. The Problem of Definition
The most serious methodological shortcoming of Justice Scalia's
traditionalism is that it fails to offer a satisfactory account of how a
relevant tradition is to be defined, assuming that the available evi-
dence points unambiguously to a practice or custom with a lengthy
enough pedigree to qualify for traditional status. Justice Scalia's
opinion in Burnham illustrates the definitional problem without ap-
pearing to appreciate it. In attempting to establish the breadth of
adherence by the states to the rule of transient jurisdiction, Justice
Scalia observes that many states created exemptions from amena-
bility to process in a variety of specific situations. 224 Exemptions
were commonly recognized for persons who were, for example,
present in the forum in order to testify in other matters, 225 to defend
(or sometimes prosecute) other litigation226 or whose presence was
induced by force or fraud. 227 He concludes, correctly, that these
exemptions were (and are) necessarily premised upon the under-
standing that presence conferred jurisdiction, at least generally.
But what the existence of such exemptions also demonstrates
is that the states did not adhere to the transient rule where doing
so contravened public policy, at least as embodied in the exemptions
themselves. Any definition of the salient tradition must, therefore,
incorporate the exceptions as well as the transient rule. But this
might be done in any number of different ways, none of which is
inherently superior to the others.
225 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 124-57 (1990).
2" Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2112.
225 See, e.g., Stewart v. Ramsay, 242 U.S. 128, 130-31 (1916); Kelly v. Pennington, 78
Cob. 482, 484-85, 242 P. 681, 682 (1926); Fox v. Hale and Norcross Silver Min. Co., 108
Cal. 369, 374, 41 P. 308, 325 (1895).
226 See, e.g., Page Co. v. MacDonald, 261 U.S. 446, 447-48 (1922); Beatty v. Monahan,
240 III. App. 240, 246-47 (1926): Dixon v. Shearer, 98 Misc. 614, 615, 163 N.Y.S. 79, 79
(1917).
2" See, e.g., Wyman v. Newhouse, 93 F.2d 313, 314-15 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303
U.S. 664 (1938); Benesch v. Foss, 31 F.2d 118, 118 (D. Mass. 1929); Wanzer v. Bright, 52 Ill.
35 (1869).
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One possible definition, for which Justice Scalia would presum-
ably opt, is that presence confers jurisdiction unless the individual
served is a member of a category of persons specifically exempted
from service of process. Of course, there would still be the question
of how to handle the case of a person falling into one of those
categories in a state which did not recognize an exemption, but that
question involves somewhat different considerations. 228 Another
way to define the tradition is to say that presence confers jurisdiction
unless inconsistent with some articulated public policy. The state
cases, together with the exemptions understood as examples of
instances where jurisdiction should not be asserted, would support
this definition. Yet a third possible view is that presence confers
jurisdiction only when the jurisdictional assertion comports with the
underlying policy rationale for the exemptions: fairness to parties
and witnesses. 229
We are thus again confronted with the need to make a discre-
tionary choice among equally logical competing alternatives. With
respect to the manner in which a tradition should be defined, how-
ever, unlike his lack of instruction on the problem of identification,
Justice Scalia does offer some guidance as to how a judge should
proceed (although not in Burnham where, as indicated above, he
seems not to recognize the difficulty). He articulates his prescription
in a case involving a claim of substantive due process, Michael H. v.
Gerald D. 23° Although the role of tradition in substantive due process
varies from its role in procedural due process, 23 ' Justice Scalia's
opinion requires exploration.
228 For Justice Scalia, that question might prove difficult to answer. As indicated in Part
I, he does condone reference to fundamental fairness analysis to evaluate the constitutionality
of procedures that depart from historical practice. See Schad v. Arizona, Ill S. Ct. 2491,
2501 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). But whether a state's failure ever to create an exemption
constitutes a permissible "departure" from historical practice is not clear. It presumably
depends, at least to some extent, upon whether the exemption rises to the level of a tradition,
and then upon whether the tradition is sufficiently fundamental that it cannot be deviated
from. As I argue in the text, neither of those questions is susceptible of an a priori answer.
229 Fairness to parties and witnesses is not the only rationale for the exemptions. They
also serve to facilitate the administration of justice by removing impediments to the attend-
ance of nonresidents at legal proceedings. See Case Notes, 4 S. CAL. L. REV. 245 (1931).
230 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
29l I n substantive due process analysis, tradition may be consulted as an aid in determin-
ing whether the right at issue is worthy of constitutional protection. See id. at 133. In
procedural due process analysis, tradition bears on the particular procedure that must be
afforded before a constitutionally protected right may be interfered with or limited. See
Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2115. Scholars disagree as to whether issues of personal jurisdiction
are best understood as substantive or procedural, although this disagreement is essentially
another way of arguing about whether the Fourteenth Amendment should be understood
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Michael H. was the biological father of a female child conceived
and born to a married woman living with her husband.232 Under
California law, which governed the case, the child was conclusively
presumed to be the daughter of the husband. 233 As a consequence
of this legal bar to his establishing paternity, Michael was denied
the right to visit his natural daughter. 234 He challenged the law as
a violation of his right to substantive due process. 235
Writing for a plurality of the Court, Justice Scalia rejected
Michael's claim that his paternal interest was a protectable liberty
interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. 236 Justice Scalia found
that in construing the Due Process Clause the Court had "insisted
not merely that the interest denominated as a 'liberty' be 'funda-
mental' (a concept that, in isolation, is hard to objectify), but also
that it be an interest traditionally protected by our society." 237 The
interest of an unwed father in visiting his illegitimate child failed
to qualify. As Justice Scalia saw it:
[T]he legal issue in the present case reduces to whether
the relationship between persons in the situation of Mi-
chael and [the child's mother] has been treated as a pro-
tected family unit under the historic practices of our so-
ciety, or whether on any other basis it has been accorded
special protection. We think it impossible to find that it
has. 238
to reflect a concern with state sovereignty as well as with individual liberty. Cf. Stein, supra
note 195, at 599 n.13 ("excessive assertions of jurisdiction are not procedural due process
problems; they are, in a more meaningful sense, substantive due process issues") with Redish,
supra note 204, at 687 (speaking of "the need to develop coherent procedural principles as
a means of fostering fairness").
292
	 H., 491 U.S. at 113-14.
235 /d. at 115-16.
234 Id.
245
	 H., 491 U.S. at 116.
256 Id. at 118-30. Justice Scalia wrote for himself', Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, however, specifically disassociated
themselves from the most provocative part of Justice Scalia's opinion, footnote six, because
they were unwilling to "foreclose the unanticipated by the prior imposition of a single mode
of historical analysis." Id. at 132 (O'Connor, J., with whom Kennedy, J., joins, concurring in
part), Justice Stevens provided the fifth vote to uphold the California statute. Unlike Justice
Scalia, Justice Stevens thought that Michael's parental interest was entitled to Fourteenth
Amendment protection, but he thought that the decision as to whether recognizing that
interest in the form of mandatory visitation was in the best interest of the child was properly
left to the discretion of the California court. Id. at 132-36.
237
 Id. at 122.
258
 Id. at 124.
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Justice Scalia's traditionalist approach to substantive due pro-
cess is vulnerable to criticism on a number of grounds, most of
which are enumerated by Justice Brennan in his eloquent dissent." 9
The important criticism for present purposes, though, is that Justice
Scalia construed the relevant tradition too narrowly. Justice Bren-
nan argued that the Court should focus not upon the historical
treatment of men who beget children via adulterous affairs with
married women, but "whether parenthood is an interest that his-
torically has received our attention and protection.'' 240
It is in response to this last criticism that Justice Scalia an-
nounces his methodology for defining a tradition. The methodology
is contained in footnote six of his opinion, which, if it is ever blessed
by a majority of the Court, may become perhaps the second most
important footnote in Supreme Court history. 24 ' Justice Scalia
writes:
Though the dissent has no basis for the level of generality
it would select, we do: We refer to the most specific level
at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying pro-
tection to, the asserted right can be identified:242
The rationale for this rule of specificity, of course, is that it will rein
in judges. As Justice Scalia explains:
Because . . . general traditions provide such imprecise
guidance, they permit judges to dictate rather than discern
the society's views. . . . Although assuredly having the
virtue (if it be that) of leaving judges free to decide as they
think best when the unanticipated occurs, a rule of law
that binds neither by text nor by any particular, identifi-
able tradition, is no rule of law at al1. 243
The reality, however, is that Justice Scalia's commandment of
specificity is not the neutral rule of law he claims it to be. Because
history never repeats itself exactly, there will never be a single
tradition which encompasses the entire factual predicate of a case.
There will always be a virtually infinite number of potentially rele-
239 /d. at 136. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan was joined in his dissent by
Justices Marshall and Blackmun. Justice White also filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice
Brennan joined. Id. at 157 (White, J., dissenting). The criticisms enumerated by Justice
Brennan are discussed infra Part IIC.
2" Id. at 139 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
241 cf. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
242 Michael H., 491 U.S, at 127-28 n.6.
43 Id.
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vant facts from which it will be necessary to abstract away the
nonessential from the essential. As Professor Tribe and Michael
Dorf convincingly demonstrate, the process of abstraction can never
be performed as a matter of pure logic; it will always involve judg-
ment.244
 This may be illustrated with reference both to Michael H.
and Burnham.
Justice Scalia describes the issue in Michael H. as whether the
states "in fact award substantive parental rights to the natural father
of a child conceived within, and born into, an extant marital union
that wishes to embrace the child." 245
 This is hardly the only way of
describing the facts of the case. Michael had lived with his daughter
at various times, contributed to her support, held her out as his
child, wanted to maintain a relationship with her, and had her call
him "Daddy."246
 The Court could just as easily have framed the
issue as whether the states have traditionally recognized the rights
of a natural father in the situation Justice Scalia presents when the
father's relationship with his daughter is the same as Michael's and
his daughter's. This inquiry is manifestly more specific than the one
Justice Scalia undertook. It is, indeed, so specific that it is doubtful
we would ever find a case precisely on point, let alone anything
which could count as a tradition. But if we retreat to the next level
of generality and begin to exclude "irrelevant" facts, how do we
know which counts more: biology and affection, or adultery? 247
it is clear where Justice Scalia comes down on that issue: "no
fewer than six times, [he] refers to Michael as the 'adulterous natural
father."248
 His bias in favor of the unitary family thus leads him to
emphasize the marriage of the child's mother and her husband over
Michael's parental rights. His definition of the "relevant" tradition
in the case is, accordingly, anything but "neutral." And his admo-
nition to his brethren and sister and instruction to his inferiors to
refer to the "most specific level at which a relevant tradition . . . can
be identified"249
 is not in any way a cure for the "problem" of judicial
subjectivity. It will remain up to judges to determine when a tradi-
tion, or which one of a number of (conflicting) traditions, is relevant
to deciding a case.
244 Lawrence H. Tribe and Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights,
57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057 (1990).
245 491 U.S. at 122.
246 Id. at 143-44 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
247 See Tribe & Dorf, supra note 244, at 1092.
24B
	 Michael H., 491 U.S. 110,144 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added by the
dissent).
249 /d. at 127-28 n.6.
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Justice Scalia is not unaware of the "levels of generality" prob-
lem. His response, in part, is that any alternative approach is form-
less and incoherent. His position is also that there is utility in cate-
gorical rules notwithstanding their potential for arbitrariness, so
long as the rules are grounded in tradition. In Burnham, he criticizes
Justice Brennan's insistence that assertions of jurisdiction be mea-
sured by "contemporary notions of due process" as consisting not
of:
a rule of law at all, but only a 'totality of the circumstances'
test, guaranteeing what traditional territorial rules of ju-
risdiction were designed precisely to avoid: uncertainty
and litigation over the preliminary issue of the forum's
competence.25°
Because in his view physical presence is "the very baseline of
reasonableness" against which jurisdiction has hitherto been mea-
sured,25 ' Justice Scalia is willing to tolerate the substantial hardship
that the unwavering application of the transient rule may cause in
particular cases. He asks rhetorically without answering, because he
deems the answer to be irrelevant: "What if, for example, Mr.
Burnham were visiting a sick child? Or a dying child?" 252
Many of us would feel, 1 suspect, that the answer to the ques-
tions Justice Scalia poses is very relevant. If the choice is between
recognizing an exception to the transient rule and discouraging a
parent from visiting a sick or dying child, then it is hard not to
come down in favor of the former. Moreover, the Supreme Court
has previously recognized that jurisdictional rules ought to take note
of familial considerations. 253
This is not to deny the value of categorical legal rules. Cate-
gorical rules serve, at least in the abstract, to advance the goal of
equality by ensuring that like cases are treated alike, to render the
law more predictable and, therefore, more fair,254 and to reduce
the cost of the administration of justice by reducing the volume of
litigation and easing the burden on the decisionmaker. 255 As Justice
2" Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2119.
2" Id.
252 Id. at 2118.
2" See Kulko v. Superior Court of California, 436 U.S. 84, 93 (1978) (expressing a
concern that jurisdictional rules not be applied to "discourage parents from entering into
reasonable visitation agreements").
2'4 See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 20, at l 179.
255 See, e.g., KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 64-65 (1930).
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Brandeis put it, "in most matters it is more important that the
applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right." 256
 This
is particularly true, as Justice Scalia suggests, with respect to the
litigation of procedural matters like jurisdiction which consume
judicial resources on issues unrelated to the merits of a contro-
versy. 257
Nevertheless, there must still be a weighing of the systemic
benefit categorical rules engender against the suboptimal results
they cause in particular cases. 255 This is, after all, the lesson of
International Shoe. The Supreme Court did not replace sovereign
territoriality with a test of minimum contacts to clarify the rules of
personal jurisdiction and thereby reduce the volume of litigation
over the forum's competence. On the contrary, it overruled Pennoyer
because Pennoyer's analytical framework had become unworkable,
despite the fact that the minimum contacts test it substituted is far
less certain in form and has led to far more litigation in application
than Justice Field's two principles of jurisdiction. 259 In Shaffer, too,
the Court was unwilling to continue to abide the fundamental un-
fairness of requiring defendants to submit to suit wherever they
owned property in order to limit the consumption of judicial re-
sources. 2"" Thus, while categorical rules have their place, judges
must still determine in any particular situation whether the overall
benefit of establishing a categorical rule will exceed the harm it will
cause in exceptional cases.
Justice Scalia's traditionalism cannot be defended as a means
of limiting judicial discretion. There is no such thing as "the most
specific level" of a "relevant" tradition which may be mechanically
invoked to decide a case. Determining the appropriate level of
specificity at which to recognize a tradition and formulate a legal
rule, and deciding which past practices should be taken account of
in making those decisions, require judges to do what their title
implies: make judgments. The contention that this can be done in
a value-free manner is fatuous.
It is clear, moreover, that even for Justice Scalia, traditionalist
methodology will yield to permit a desired result. He has acknowl-
edged openly, as alluded to in Fart I, that he would not sustain the
256
 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2" See Burnham, 111) S. Ct. at 2119.
25"
	 Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN, L. REv. 571, 595-602 (1987).
259
	 Relish, supra note 204, at 686.
260 433 U.S. at 211.
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constitutionality of flogging even if it were widely practiced and
historically well entrenched. 26 ' More revealingly, he vigorously con-
demned a minority set-aside program adopted by a predominantly
African-American city council in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 262
without mentioning either the tradition of ethnic "self-help" in
awarding government contracts or the general ubiquity of govern-
ment-sponsored affirmative action programs. 263
Much of the foregoing discussion about the shortcomings of
traditionalism and the impossibility of value-free adjudication may
seem patently obvious, an attack mounted against a straw man. It
is nevertheless important to debunk these myths not only because
they are nominally being relied upon as rules for decision by Justice
Scalia and others, but because they receive such widespread cur-
rency in the body politic at large. President Bush, for example, has
repeatedly identified a willingness to abide by tradition and not
"legislate from the bench" as one of the most important attitudes
he seeks in a judicial nominee.'"
The traditionalist misdescription of the nature of adjudication
is not harmless. It enables judges to smuggle their values into the
interpretive process under the guise of adhering to purportedly
"controlling" traditions or rules which are in reality the product of
value-driven choices:2"1 Legal discourse and, ultimately, the law it-
self, are impoverished as a consequence. Instead of debating
whether the preservation of the unitary family justifies prohibiting
a natural father from establishing paternity when the prohibition
against his doing so was enacted prior to the development of reliable
26 I See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
262 988 U.S. 969, 520-28 (Scalia, J., concurring) (1989).
2" See id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia's failure to discuss the tradition of
ethnic self-help is noted in Strauss, supra note 54, at 1709. Professor Strauss is particularly
critical of Justice Scalia on this score because of his dissenting opinion in Rutan v. Republican
Party, 110 S. Ct. 2729, 2746 (1990), in which he maintained that one of the reasons patronage
hiring did not violate the First Amendment was that it enabled racial and ethnic tninorites
who were able to dominate local government to entrench themselves by dispensing jobs as
rewards to their supporters. Id. at 2755 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Strauss, supra note 54, at 1709,
Professor Edelman, citing as evidence Croson and a number of other cases, is highly scornful
of Justice Scalia's purported reliance upon methodology, remarking upon "the noticeable
tendency of the Justice to depart from his method when he feels he needs to for one reason
or another." Peter B. Edelman, Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence and the Good Society: Shades of Felix
Frankfurter and Harvard Hil Parade of the 1950s, 12 CARDOZO L. Rev. 1799, 1800 (1991).
264 See, e.g., Excerpts from News Conference Announcing Court Nominee, N.Y. Times, July 2,
1991 at A14; Ruth Marcus, Bush Quietly Fosters Conservative Trend in Courts, WASH. POST,
February 18, 1991 at A1, A9.
263 See Tribe & fort, supra note 244, at 1096.
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blood tests and at a time when the stigma of illegitimacy was far
greater than it is today,266
 we are told the debate is irrelevant by a
Supreme Court Justice who has already made up his mind but hides
behind "tradition" to avoid having to engage his opponents. Simi-
larly, instead of debating whether the utility of physical presence as
a categorical rule of jurisdiction is worth the price of discouraging
parents from visiting their children, even if they are sick or dying,
we are told that "tradition" compels this result notwithstanding that
the authority relied upon is somewhat ambiguous and no case has
ever addressed this precise question.267
The use of tradition in this manner, as a cover for political
choices, is subversive of the rule of law. It serves to stifle debate in
the service of a particular political agenda. In the short run, "tra-
ditionalists" will reap a benefit because they are able to accomplish
their objectives under a patina of deniability. If attacked they may
assert that they were "only following [traditional] orders." In the
long run, however, their disingenuousness will diminish respect for
the law and the judges who administer it.
C. The Value of Tradition
As I observed in Part IIB, Justice Scalia's use of specific tradi-
tions to define interests entitled to recognition as a matter of sub-
stantive due process may be criticized in a number of respects in
addition to its failure to limit judicial discretion as advertised. His
approach is indifferent to the Supreme Court's precedents, which
have recognized that a specific tradition denying a right may conflict
with a broader tradition including that same right. 268 It is highly
266 See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 161-62 (White, J., dissenting).
267
 This is not to say that a categorical jurisdictional rule is not justifiable. A case can be
made that a categorical rule would be particularly well suited to the resolution of a threshold
litigation problem like jurisdiction so as to limit the diversion of resources away from the
merits of a case. Indeed, it can be argued that such a rule should control even where it might
serve theoretically to dissuade parents from visiting their children because the deterrent
effect of the transient rule is likely to be minimal. As in Burnham, in most instances where
the rule might be invoked there are likely to be sufficient contacts to sustain an assertion of
jurisdiction in any event, and the ease of modern transportation and communication have
lessened the burden of appearing in a distant forum to the point where the prospect of
having to do so is unlikely to be given much weight in the calculation of a parent sincerely
interested in visiting his or her child. My point here is not so much that the transient rule
cannot possibly be defended on policy grounds, but that Justice Scalia's invocation of tradition
excuses him from the need actually to defend it.
"H
 The best examples of this type of conflict are the race discrimination cases where the
specific practices in question, e.g., the anti-miscegenation statutes in Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967), or the segregation of schools in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
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majoritarian, emphasizing only those traditions which have achieved
formal legal recognition. 269 It is excessively deferential to the states,
enabling them to define through their own practices what the Four-
teenth Amendment permits them to do.27° It reads the open-tex-
tured Due Process Clause strangely, as merely a codification of
specific practices at a particular historical time. 271 In addition, it
glosses over the unpleasant truth that many of our traditions are
odious, unworthy of contemporary recognition or respect. 272
It might seem that tradition should be banished from (due
process) adjudication entirely, as a nettlesome impediment to
achieving a just legal order. This would be an overreaction, and a
deleterious one. The problem is not with looking to tradition per se
as a guide to interpretation, which is probably inevitable, but with
doing so exclusively. When Justice Scalia remarks in Michael H. that
it is important to consult tradition in interpreting the Due Process
Clause in order to "prevent future generations from lightly casting
.aside important traditional values," 273 I agree with him. We should
no more unthinkingly discard a venerable tradition than demolish
a sound building. Much of our accumulated wisdom and experience
is reflected in our traditions, and our first impulse ought to be to
preserve them.
were struck down by the Supreme Court despite their pedigree because they were inconsistent
with the broader command of equality.
v69 As Professsor Redish aptly puts the matter, "the whole point of the Constitution is to
act as check on majoritarian practice." Redish, supra note 204, at 685. See also JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 69 (1980).
The concern with the possible excesses of majoritarianism is especially acute in the area
of territorial jurisdiction because the most exorbitant jurisdictional assertions will be at-
tempted against nonresidents who by definition have no ability to participate in the political
process in the forum state.
27° See. e,g., Justice Brennan's dissent in Michael H., 491 U.S. at 136, 140-41. Justice
Brennan stated:
[TJhe plurality acts as if the only purpose of the Due Process Clause is to
confirm the importance of interests already protected by a majority of States.
Transforming the protection afforded by the Due Process Clause into a redun-
dancy mocks those who, with care and purpose, wrote the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
Id, at 140-41 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2" The broad sweep of the majestic phrase "due process of law" suggests that the framers
were concerned with generic problems that might arise rather than insisting upon adherence
to extant procedures for the duration of history. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 204, at 684
("Surely, due process has never been construed to 'grandfather' in all procedural practices
existing at the time of the clause's adoption").
"2 See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 54, at 1712,
2" 491 U.S. at 122 n.2.
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But to assert as Justice Scalia does that traditions are beyond
reinterpretation is unacceptable. There is too much about them
which may be abhorrent or irrelevant to bind us uncritically. We
should revere those traditions which warrant reverence, but freely
abandon those which are no longer worthy of respect. In the context
of procedural due process, we should accord historical practices a
presumptive validity," but insist that the presumption be readily
rebuttable.
The quest for a methodology which takes the judgment out of
judging is misguided. Law is far more art than it is science. What
we can reasonably expect from members of the bench is their best
effort to discover, expound and apply the law as they understand
it. What we should demand is that they articulate their reasons for
decisions with candor. Justice Scalia has it wrong: the principal
danger of judging is not that judges will read their own values into
the law, but that they will do so while pretending not to.
